CHARLES DE GAULLE & THE FRENCH RESISTANCE

A Case Study on the Legitimacy and Contention of a Resistance and its Leader

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Master’s thesis

Master’s programme in Civil Society

Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy

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ABSTRACT

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Charles de Gaulle, one of the most notable leaders of the French history, rose to power outside democratic processes. When he departed for London in June 1940 to continue the opposition against Germany, de Gaulle was not an elected official nor did he hold a significant governmental post. He was also lacking public support, but nevertheless managed to become the symbol of French resistance and emerge as the leader of post-war France. Years later, he again became the head of his country outside democratic processes, yet history does not question his legitimacy as a leader. This master’s thesis looks into the foundation of de Gaulle’s legitimacy, and attempts to explain why and how he became a legitimate leader.

Four elemental themes have been identified to construe de Gaulle’s legitimacy. France’s national identity and the country’s contentious tradition provided a context for the rise of the resistance, and legitimized its actions. The crimes committed by the Vichy government resulted in the loss of its legitimacy which then provided a space for a new legitimate actor to enter the political sphere of the country. The French Resistance and its endorsement of de Gaulle enabled him to absorb some of the movement’s legitimacy, and provided him with the essential support that is necessary for any leader of a movement. Finally, charisma, de Gaulle’s own personality granted him the tools to enforce his vision for France. Together, these four elements explain his legitimacy.

Key words: Legitimacy, Charles de Gaulle, the French Resistance, social movements, contentious politics
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1. Introduction

‘Toute ma vie, je me suis fait une certaine idée de la France’ Charles de Gaulle

What lured me into writing my master’s thesis on the legitimacy of a long gone French president was the great story behind it. Charles de Gaulle has been perhaps the most notable leader in the whole history of France, a man who came into power by unconventional means and the power of his own personality, whose years as the head of the country attracted continuous accusations of authoritarian behavior. He is also the man who ensured that France would be able to rise from the ruins of World War II, and whose legacy to his motherland includes, among many other things, a constitution that was able to pull the country out of the political turmoil that had tormented it for decades. His relationship with the general public was volatile; when he emerged as the leader of the Free French to continue the battle against the Nazis, he had no fame or public position to speak of. After the war he became a celebrated hero and symbol of national pride, only to find his ideas on political reform to be pushed aside. After spending years out of the public eye, he was called to save the nation when a revolt in Algiers had driven France into a state of turmoil. An aloof president who initially enjoyed high approval rates by the public, de Gaulle finished his career with his heart broken and stepped out of office after ten years having lost a referendum of approval. His legacy, however, remains.

When de Gaulle left for England in June 1940 refusing to accept the armistice with Germany, he had never been elected into office and held no significant government post, yet he was to be identified with France for the coming decades. Condemned to death by the official French government, de Gaulle worked outside democratic processes during this period in time and to complicate things even further, the French public initially agreed with the collaborationist Vichy regime. Despite being the most prominent person in the French political arena from 1944 onwards, he held no electoral claim to power until 1958, and even then he was elected President by a college of dignitaries. A direct vote by the people occurred as late as 1962, and before this he had successfully served as the head of the provisional government after the Liberation and had been called out of retirement to handle

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1 de Gaulle, 1954, 1
the situation in Algiers. How is it possible that history has accepted de Gaulle as a legitimate leader despite everything he did outside commonly accepted democratic norms? What is the basis of his legitimacy?

My thesis aims to answer the question of the source of de Gaulle’s legitimacy. De Gaulle’s contemporaries offered arguments for and against his legitimacy; some criticized him for not having been elected into office, while others argued that his quest to save France and its people was more than enough to make him legitimate. However, despite being a well-documented and a much written figure, there is little literature focusing specifically on his legitimacy as a leader. The subject is touched upon in many of the biographies written about him and in other works\(^2\) that include a discussion on de Gaulle’s rise to power, yet they are mostly content in agreeing that his willingness to sacrifice himself for his country and for what he believed was the right thing to do were enough to make him a legitimate person of authority. It is often his ‘righteousness’ that is given the most attention, yet I am also interested in other elements besides the normative dimension. I will argue that his extraordinary willingness to fight for his motherland and its people are an important part of his legitimacy, but that there are other factors which need to be taken into consideration as well. One of these elements is his merger with the French Resistance, the various independent dissident groups that operated in France during WWII. I will use legitimacy concepts by four political theorists in addition to understanding social movements, i.e. the French Resistance, as having the power to legitimate in order to demonstrate how I see the construction of de Gaulle’s legitimacy.

1.1. Structure & Methodology

My aim is to take a detailed look into this historical case study, and examine which factors construed de Gaulle’s legitimacy as a leader. The political leadership of Western democracies often base their legitimacy on democratic processes. Honest elections are a commonly approved method to elect leaders, who are deemed as legitimate also by those who did not cast their vote for them. In monarchies, it is heritage that gives one the claim to legitimate authority. De Gaulle, however, was neither a royal nor an elected official. His case is a more complex one, and in my thesis I have aimed to explore the roots of his legitimacy.

\(^2\) E.g. Cogan 1996, Fenby 2010, Dallas 2005, Cassin 1941
I begin with the premise that de Gaulle indeed was a legitimate leader, despite not having initially been elected into office or having any hereditary claim to a position of authority. Even though he reached a position of power outside commonly accepted processes, at present there is little debate challenging his legitimacy. De Gaulle’s legacy is visible in modern France; the main airport in Paris is named after him, and in 2005 a poll by the country’s national television station, France 2, chose de Gaulle as the most notable figure from the whole of French history (Fenby, 2010, 9). He is commonly accepted and referred to as one of the three main Allied leaders during WWII, among the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and the American President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Modern French politicians refer to de Gaulle in their orations; previous French president Nicolas Sarkozy often mentioned de Gaulle in his speeches to arouse the support of the public. Therefore I have found it acceptable to treat de Gaulle as a legitimate leader. However, the general acknowledgment of de Gaulle’s legitimacy fails to answer why he was a justified leader, and to what degree is his legitimacy connected to the evolution and success of both de Gaulle and the French Resistance. As Haunss (2007) has noted, questions of legitimacy can have a powerful part in the mobilization of social movements. Because of the high visibility and potential power of social movements he sees it necessary to pay attention also to connections between collective action and the processes of legitimation. It is my view as well that social movements can serve as legitimating or delegitimating actors, as in de Gaulle’s context the French Resistance was a key element in the build-up of his authority.

I have identified four elements that when combined, built de Gaulle’s legitimacy, despite his leadership role not being a creation of any specific democratic process and will proceed to demonstrate how these features together construed his legitimacy. I will begin each chapter with a brief look into a specific historical event, mostly basing the narrative on Jean Lacouture’s *the Rebel*, Jonathan Fenby’s *General Charles de Gaulle and the France He Saved* and de Gaulle’s *Mémoires de Guerre*, and will then analyze these situations through a theoretical lens. Legitimacy concepts by Max Weber, John Locke, Jean-Marc Coicaud, and David Beetham as well as Charles Tilly’s and Sidney Tarrow’s framework of

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3 e.g. http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwog/allies_at_war_01.shtml
contentious politics in the study of social movements are used to construct the theoretical framework for the thesis. The theories are briefly introduced in Chapter 2, *Legitimacy and Contention*. The structure of this work follows the four elements I have identified as the building blocks of de Gaulle’s legitimacy. To facilitate the reader, I have attempted to organize the chapters into a chronological historical order, even though events at times overlap. Each chapter, *France’s Contentious Identity, the Vichy Government, the French Resistance,* and *Charisma* begins with an introduction to the historical context followed by an analysis using the ideas of the previously mentioned theorists. Initially I intended to make a clear separation and limit each theorist under a specific theme; however, once I began the writing process it was clear that this kind of separation was not feasible. As themes and ideas overlap, it felt forced to limit each theorist to just one theme. Therefore I have chosen to use the theories in an intertwined manner to analyze the historical events. In the conclusion I will proceed to demonstrate how all these elements tie together to build the source for de Gaulle’s legitimacy.

I begin the analysis from the French national identity in Chapter 3. The history and cultural identity of the French people form the basis for the other three elements; in some other nation, an armistice would not have caused such a blow to the national identity, nor left room for a charismatic leader to arise. The contentious tradition of France and the French people is an important feature when analyzing the Resistance. The repertoires of contention the French had and the frequent uprisings the country has witnessed during its history were a factor in the birth of the resistance. Given how wide-spread and frequent contentious action has been in the French history, it is my view that it is a legitimate form of action. Therefore, I will argue that in this case legitimacy is very much tied into the cultural and historical tradition of the country, and is thus context-based. Chapter 4 focuses on the Vichy government, detailing how it came to power and how it acted after signing the armistice with Germany. De Gaulle’s and the Resistance’s legitimacy is strongly tied to the Vichy government, and for its lack of legitimacy. There cannot exist two legitimate authorities at any given time in one sphere, and therefore it is necessary for one to lose its legitimacy before the other can gain any. The Vichy government rose to power under dubious circumstances and abused the rights of the French people, which resulted in the loss of its legitimacy. This then opened a space for de Gaulle and the French Resistance. In Chapter 5 the attention is on the French Resistance, discussing the evolution of the resistance and the union of the various dissident groups under de Gaulle’s leadership. The
Resistance is seen as having the power legitimate and also to delegitimate its opponents. The Resistance fighters gained legitimacy for their willingness for personal sacrifices to rid their motherland of the invaders, and de Gaulle absorbed some of this legitimacy to his own persona by becoming the leader of the various resistance groups. This chapter also notes the people’s right to revolution under a wrongful government, and points out the role of consent and followers in the legitimization process. I will argue that legitimacy requires an element of perception; had de Gaulle not had any followers or supporters for his initiative, he could not have been a legitimate leader. This element of perception is also a part of what provides social movements their ability to acts as legitimizing instruments. The final part of the analysis focuses on de Gaulle’s persona and characteristics as a leader, which is discussed in Chapter 6. His charisma, sense of destiny and stubbornness are in large part responsible for everything he accomplished for France. I will then tie the four elements together in the conclusion.

Other books are consulted as well, but mostly I have used Jean Lacouture’s *the Rebel* and Jonathan Fenby’s *The General Charles de Gaulle and the France He Saved* as the main sources for the historical context of the thesis. *The Rebel* (1990) is widely agreed to be one of the most accomplished works on de Gaulle, while Fenby’s book, which was published in 2010, is to my understanding the most current bibliography available. In addition, as a primary source, I have often relied on de Gaulle’s personal account on the events of World War II, which he has narrated in his *Mémoires de Guerre*. The original French copy of the War Memoirs is divided into three parts, of which I have used the first part *Mémoires de Guerre L’Appel 1940—1942*. *L’Appel 1940—1942* narrates the first years of the war that have mainly been the focus of the thesis. I have used the English translation, *War Memoirs*, for the later years because I personally own a copy and its availability has thus been more convenient. Since my intention has been to use de Gaulle’s predicament as a case study through which to examine the concept of legitimacy, not to give a detailed and profound description of the events of World War II, I have deemed these books to be suitable and sufficient for the purposes of the thesis. Had one chosen to look into this topic from a historian’s point of view, a far more arduous process would have been necessary. My focus has been on events that occurred between 1930 —1960, and given how much time has passed, many original materials are not widely available today. Lacouture and Fenby have naturally relied on many archived and often diplomatic sources in their works, and disappointingly, considering that these sources are stored either in France, England or the
United States, I did not have access to them. However, given that mine is a master’s thesis and one that focuses on a concept of political science, I believe that the historical context of the thesis is acceptable. Fenby attempts to offer an objective look into the life of de Gaulle, while Lacouture provides a deeper analysis his mind and character. The *Mémoires de Guerre* then reveals de Gaulle’s thoughts on the events that passed. The historical situation offers the starting point for the theoretical analysis, and for it I have chosen theorists whose ideas on legitimacy could be of help in understanding de Gaulle’s predicament. I will argue that none of the theories would suffice on their own, and my aim is to build a framework that ties the concepts together in order to provide a justifiable argument for de Gaulle’s legitimacy.

A major issue I faced when writing the thesis was the complexity of the topic. Even when focusing specifically on de Gaulle, the Free French and to a certain degree the Vichy regime, World War II included such a myriad of individuals, events, motives and consequences that it would have required years to truly understand and grasp the full picture. Therefore I have been forced to oversimplify and shorten the historical events and backgrounds in order to not prolong the thesis unnecessarily. De Gaulle had an extremely complex personality and he struggled for power among the Allies and the French resistance right until the Liberation, both topics which I have not dwelled into deeper. More fascinating information has been left out than included; for example, prior to the events of World War II, de Gaulle’s wartime adversary and head of the Vichy regime Philippe Pétain was actually his mentor, and the two men had a close relationship. In fact, de Gaulle even named his son Philippe. It would have been interesting to look into all these themes further, but again, to keep the thesis concise, I have been forced to either disregard or to explain very briefly information that would otherwise have been fascinating. The development of the structure of the thesis and the categorization of the historical information proved out to be the biggest obstacle I faced during the writing process. How to take such a tremendous amount of information, divide it into parts, try to keep it logical and chronological in a way that would allow the reader to follow the events, but also to divide the events into themes that would be useful for the purposes of the analysis. The whole process took months and often felt overwhelming. I have also intentionally excluded several names of individuals from the text. For reasons of clarity, I have chosen not to refer to certain people, e.g. Prime Minister Paul Reynaud’s mistress on page 28 by name, since I felt that naming persons who are only mentioned once or twice in the text would not be
useful either for the reader or for the purposes of the thesis. There would simply have been too many details for a reader not fully immersed in the details of de Gaulle’s life and the events of WWII to be able to follow the text smoothly.

This is a theoretical thesis. In the beginning I consulted several Finnish thesis writing guidebooks for guidance, to no avail. Most of them do not touch the subject of a theoretical thesis, and the ones that do, cover it with a line or two. In fact, the most comprehensive ‘guide’ to writing a theoretical thesis I have found is included in ‘Ohjeita pro gradu – tutkielman laatimiseksi’ by the Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Jyväskylä. The faculty’s online thesis writing guide states that there really is no clear model for a theoretical work; rather, the process involves an intertwined medley of reading, thinking, writing and analyzing. The lack of a clear formula or writing guide made me rather desperate at times, and prompted me to question whether it is even acceptable to write something outside the structures covered in guidebooks. Well, this is my attempt.

1.2. Biography

This brief biography of de Gaulle is intended to familiarize the reader with the historical context of my analysis, and to gain some insight into events that will be discussed more in detail later on. It is rather crucial that the reader has some level of understanding of the events of World War II to be able follow the structure of the thesis. However, I have tried to avoid falling into the trap of writing excessively about events that are trivial for the purposes of this thesis. After all, my intention is to study a concept of political science, not history. I have chosen to simplify the accounts and omit some names, as a detailed historical narrative would be rather difficult to follow. I chose to include this brief account on de Gaulle in the introduction so that the reader would have an overall understanding of the events of World War II and of de Gaulle’s life, before continuing into the differently themed chapters. Each chapter focuses on a different aspect of these historical events, and therefore it is useful for the reader to have a vague knowledge on the topic before continuing further.

5 "Tutkimukset voivat myös olla puhtaasti teoreettisia, siis analysoida jotakin teoriaa tai käsitellä aikaisemman tutkimuskirjallisuuden nojalla. Teoreettiselle tutkimukselle ei ole valmista kaavaa; työ on lukemista, jäsentämistä, ajattelua ja ajatusten työstämistä tekstiä." https://www.jyu.fi/ytk/opiskelututkimus-valmistuminen/prograduyfi/gradu
Charles de Gaulle was born on November 22, 1890 in Lille, France and grew up in Paris as the second oldest son of a family of five children. He entered the military academy of St. Cyr at the age of nineteen and was a captain by the time he started fighting in the First World War. Captured by the Germans a year and a half into the war, de Gaulle spent his time as a prisoner perfecting his German as well as giving lectures on history and strategy to other prisoners. Later on he was granted the Legion of Honor for the courage he had shown in battle (Dallas, 2005, 89—93).

After the war de Gaulle sought to be assigned to Poland as a means of making up the ground he had lost to other officers who had fought for France during the war while he was held in captivity. De Gaulle was appointed to train officers of the Polish army, from where he returned in 1921. A year later he married Yvonne Vendroux with whom he was to have three children; Geneviève, Philippe and Anne, who had Down’s syndrome and whom de Gaulle was especially close to. From 1925 to 1927 de Gaulle worked under Marshal Philippe Pétain, the highest ranking military officer in the French army whom de Gaulle would strongly criticize years later for his support of an armistice with Germany during World War II. In the 1930s, de Gaulle began a correspondence with Paul Reynaud who was to become the prime minister of France in 1940. He also began writing extensively on military subjects proposing his idea of creating a self-contained armored strike force for France. This idea gained little support in France but was inaugurated in Germany (Fenby, 2010, 106—107, Dallas, 2005, 89—94).

In 1936 Hitler moved his troops to Rhineland, an area bordering France which had been demilitarized by the Treaty of Versailles. The French leaders did nothing. Two years later Hitler proceeded to take over the Sudetenland, and Britain and France were finally pulled into the war in 1939 based on the guarantee that Britain had given to Poland. Hitler launched a bombardment on France, Belgium and the Netherlands on May 10, 1940. Throughout all these events the French political leadership kept changing. While Hitler had been making his moves within Germany and then in Europe, de Gaulle kept persistently appealing to the ever changing French leadership to modernize its military which he, being a great believer in striking first, felt was defeatist. Watching Hitler’s conduct in Europe, de Gaulle did not find enough listeners to his observations and warnings about the plans of the enemy, which greatly frustrated him (Fenby, 2010, 99—120).
Aged eighty-four, Marshal Pétain was a great military hero of World War I but for the new, looming war he adopted a defeatist stance and pushed for an armistice with Hitler. When on June 16, 1940 Pétain was asked to form a government, de Gaulle decided to return to London where he had been working together with the British government to formulate a joint Franco-British war plan. Determined not to let his country fall in the hands of the Germans, de Gaulle held a broadcast in London over the BBC on June 18, 1940. Presenting himself as “Moi, Général de Gaulle” he declared that France would remain in the war to fight against Hitler as he appealed to the French people in England to come together and support him (de Gaulle, 1970, 3—4). De Gaulle had no institutional position or public support to back his claim; he was not a high-ranking or an elected member of the French government nor was he known to the French people. Nevertheless, he had decided to save his motherland with the force of his own persona.

In England de Gaulle broke from the French government and formed a resistance movement called La France Libre, the Free France. This led him to be sentenced to death in absentia by the Vichy government. He found practically no support for his movement from other French leaders, or for that matter, the general public. Yet de Gaulle was recognized by the British as chief of the Free French on June 28, 1940, and he continued building up the Free French Forces in London. Initially the forces consisted mainly of small numbers of French volunteers and of some French troops that had been in England prior to the armistice (de Gaulle, 1954, 74). A year later, on September 22, 1941 de Gaulle formed the French National Committee, a government in exile which was recognized by the Allies. De Gaulle was now the lone figure representing the French among the Allies, trying to guarantee a future for his country. Slowly, the Free French movement started gaining momentum and de Gaulle managed to gather a credible fighting force of his own, and, after the Allies’ victory, served as the president of the provisional government of France. He resigned, however, on January 20, 1946, when the new constitution for France was still being formed. Frustrated with the concept of parliamentary supremacy over the executive branch, de Gaulle had pushed for a strong presidency which in his opinion would be the solution to the turmoil of France’s domestic politics. When this did not happen, he saw it best to resign from his position as president (Cogan, 1996, 32—80).

Unsatisfied with the new constitution, de Gaulle then formed the Rally of the French People movement in order to promote a new reform for the French state. The movement failed. By the mid-1950s de Gaulle, who was already in his 60s, had retired to his country
home where he focused on completing *Mémoires de Guerre*. It was not until 1958 that de Gaulle returned to the national political scene as a response to a nationalist revolt in the French colony of Algeria. He was elected into office by the National Assembly and, on June 1, 1958, was given full executive powers for six months. In addition he was authorized to prepare a new constitution for the country. The Fifth Republic was passed by 78 per cent of votes and with a record voter turnout. The new constitution granted France with a strong executive and separation of powers. The Fifth Republic was to finally rid France of the turmoil it had had to endure in its domestic politics. Nevertheless, by 1968, the French society had begun to show signs of annoyance with de Gaulle’s by now almost ten year rule. Social upheaval, which culminated in student protests in May 1968, was on the rise. To test his own popularity, de Gaulle issued a referendum in 1969 and announced that he would resign if the result would go against his proposals. It did, and de Gaulle stepped down from his position as the president of France on April 28, 1969, at the age of seventy-eight. He died a year and a half later on November 9, 1970 (Fenby, 2010, 327—361, 398—406, 600—631).

2. Legitimacy and Contention

In general legitimacy is understood to mean something that is widely accepted or being in compliance with established standards and laws. In a democracy where democratic processes, for example voting, allow citizens to voice their opinion and form a government, legitimate political authority provides a justification for political rule. A functioning democratic process means that citizens accept the government’s rule and obey laws, even if they do not necessarily agree with all of the government’s decisions or casted their vote for the ruling party. A functioning society requires legitimate leadership, where the people accept the authority and rule of their leader or government. If the leadership is not regarded as legitimate by the populace, a risk of uprising and unrest persist.

The concept of legitimacy, however, is rather vague, and differs from one theorist to another. In ‘The Meaning of “Legitimacy” in World Affairs: Does Law + Ethics + Politics = A Just Pragmatism or Mere Politics?’ James O’Connor refutes the use of legitimacy precisely for its ambiguous nature and argues in favor of more substantial concepts. O’Connor maintains that in itself legitimacy is void of content, and is merely a
combination of ideas and meanings from other terms (O’Connor, 2007, 4). He continues that it is in fact not possible to hold legitimacy to any normative criteria, precisely because the term in itself is vague and does not truly mean anything. A term that does not have a meaning in itself cannot be held as a basis for judgment (Ibid., 14).

Social movement research has rarely directly studied questions of legitimacy. However, Haunss (2007, 157) has identified two distinguished approaches that have addressed the link between legitimacy and social movements, and argues that the study on social movements has in fact produced vast amounts of information on the topic even though the precise terminology of legitimacy has not been used. The first approach studies whether social movements are legitimate actors themselves, and was an issue in early social movement research, then reappearing in the 1990s with the emergence of right-wing movements and the growing importance of NGOs and SMOs. This approach sees the relevance of legitimacy relating to the ‘roles and functions of social movements in national and transnational governance structures’ or to the democratic process and organizational forms. The second approach has addressed questions of legitimacy indirectly through analyzing the tactics that movements utilize as well as the demands they make in order to achieve their goals. Haunss argues that though many studies have not explicitly researched legitimacy, they have actually addressed the matter under a different label, or their findings can be used to shed light to the matter. Therefore, he notes, what is interesting is to look into how social movements ‘ascribe or deny legitimacy to political institutions and actors, and how their ability to do so depends on their strategic choices or structural restraints. From this perspective, social movements have the ability to commit either legitimating or delegitimating acts (Haunss, 2007, 156—158). Goldstone (2003, 2) argues that social movements are not only a form of political expression, but have in essence become a part of the social structures that ‘shape and give rise to parties, courts, legislatures, and elections’. If social movements are understood as a part of normal politics, then they can also have an impact on the legitimacy of political actors, and play a crucial role in the political sphere of a country. This is the approach I will apply in the thesis, and look into the French Resistance as legitimating factor for de Gaulle.

Regarding the meaning of legitimacy, I agree with O’Connor to the vagueness of the term, but in contrast to him, I believe that legitimacy is a valuable concept exactly because it involves a multitude of meanings. It is not possible to substitute legitimacy for terms such
as legality or morality because their meaning is narrow. For example, in the context of this thesis, to focus solely on legality would completely leave out the main factors that I have found to explain de Gaulle’s legitimacy. Tilly (2004 & 1993) describes de Gaulle’s powers in 1944—45 and in 1958 as dictatorial, going so far as to call his rise to power in 1958 as a coup d'état, given the extensive powers granted to him in order for de Gaulle to be able to seize control over the situation in Algiers. However, as explained in the Introduction, the present France, whose status as a democratic country is not under question, has issued a great deal of legitimacy and respect to de Gaulle. Later on, Tilly (1993, 182) too notes that surprisingly, and especially considering what occurred in Spain and Portugal, France was not seized by a military dictatorship.

Therefore, and following Beetham, whose idea of legitimacy will be discussed later, my thesis understands legitimacy as a multidimensional term. Democracy and legitimacy are not one and the same; I see legitimacy holding some sense of normativity, while democracy is the product of people’s agreement on acceptable forms of governance. It is my belief that de Gaulle’s legitimacy, for the complexity of his situation, cannot be understood through any one theoretical lens or principle, but a combination of theories is needed for the full picture. Because of the hazy definitions of legitimacy, I will attempt to build a somewhat comprehensive picture explain the roots of de Gaulle’s legitimacy. Using the concepts of legitimacy by four political theorists, I will combine their ideas into a framework that allows us to understand why de Gaulle was a legitimate leader. Here I will briefly outline how Max Weber, John Locke, David Beetham and Jean-Marc Coicaud understand legitimacy. For contentious politics, I follow Charles Tilly’s and Sidney Tarrow’s theoretical framework, which will also be introduced.

2.1. Max Weber and Charismatic Authority

Max Weber’s classic definition of legitimacy as the subjects’ belief in the legitimacy of a given power-relationship (Weber, 1964, 325) has formed the basis for much of later literature on the concept of legitimacy. In Weber’s definition, it is the subjects’ belief in the authority of the leader that validates his legitimacy. He classifies authority relationships into three types, each which lay their claim to legitimacy based on different factors. What matters is that the claim to legitimacy is accepted as valid, and that the position of the
person in power and the exercise of power confirm the rationality of this claim (Ibid., 327). The three types of legitimate authority are legal authority, traditional authority, and charismatic authority. Legal authority rests on the belief in a legally established impersonal order, where legitimacy arises from the subjects’ acceptance of the formal legality of the office and obedience to this office. Thus it is not the person but the office that is the source of legitimate authority. Traditional authority, on the other hand, specifically relies on the acceptance of ancient traditions and of those who exercise authority under it. In this case, obedience extends to the person who holds a traditionally sanctioned position of authority within the limits of that tradition. This is a more personal relationship, where loyalty is given because of personal belief in the accustomed traditions. Finally, charismatic leadership lays the claim to legitimacy based on the persona of the leader himself. It is the special and exemplary character of the leader that prompts the subjects to obey him. Weber specifies that he has taken the concept of charisma from Christianity and understands it accordingly as ‘the gift of grace’ (Ibid., 328).

Weber attributes the term charisma to individuals who possess certain exceptional characteristics that set them apart from ordinary persons and who are treated as such by others. The characteristics that allow this kind of distinguishing are perceived to be of divine origin or so laudable that they are non-achievable for common people. The defining element, however, is not the origin of these laudable features of the leader in question but how his followers view him. Weber counts a number of elements that are the most notable characteristics of charismatic authority. To begin with, it is the followers’ concession of the leader’s charisma that validates the notion. In other words a leader cannot be charismatic if he is not perceived to be so by others. Nevertheless, it is not the charisma which is the basis for legitimacy, but the notion that it is the duty of those subject to the charismatic individual to follow him and to act according to his wishes (Ibid., 359).

The superior qualities that are associated with a charismatic individual also mean that if he is to fall victim to a strain of bad events, most likely his charismatic authority will diminish. Not being able to fulfill his goals will often mean that his followers will perceive him as unlucky, and no longer possessing the ‘gift of grace’ (Ibid., 359—360). The inner circle, or ‘administrative staff’ as Weber calls it, of a charismatic authority does not follow the usual hierarchical nominations or appointments. Rather, they are chosen based on their individual qualities and function in collective relationship with the leader. The leader articulates his will on the followers, who then act on his wishes. Charismatic authority
works outside the realms of rules and precedents, and creates its own innovative sphere of action. Because of this Weber calls charismatic authority an especially revolutionary force. Personal charisma is the only claim to legitimacy, and no position of power is acquired through anyone’s property or possessions. He continues that pure charismatic authority refrains from using charisma to acquire monetary benefits, even if this does not always happen in practice. Weber associates pure charisma to an anti-economic force because of its rebuttal of mundane practices and adherence to nonchalance regarding property acquisition (Ibid., 360—362).

Weber calls charisma ‘the greatest revolutionary force’ in ‘traditionally stereotyped periods’ (Ibid., 363). In contrast to reason, which works externally through altering the situation or by engaging the individual in deliberation, charisma motivates internally. It may lead to an inner reorientation for the individual, and it is born out of emotion. This can radically change an individual’s beliefs and modes of action towards resolving or conquering a perceived obstacle or flaw in the current system of being (Ibid., 363).

Despite its ability to motivate, initiate and inspire, charismatic leadership cannot survive without transformation. Weber claims that it is only in the birth process that charismatic authority exists in the pure form, and that it is by nature transitory. Charismatic authority cannot remain static, and it must transform into either traditional or rational authority, or a combination of both. The transformation can be motivated by two different things: ‘(a) The ideal and also the material interests of the followers in the continuation and the continual reactivation of the community, (b) the still stronger ideal and also stronger material interests of the members of the administrative staff, the disciples or other followers of the charismatic leader in continuing their relationship’ (Ibid., 364). Charismatic authority will be routinized, since it is only as long as the charismatic leader works completely outside the realms of everyday social framework that the followers contently live in communistic settings inspired by a common goal and surviving only with occasional and sporadic remuneration. In order for the movement to survive in the long run, it is necessary for a majority of the followers to receive some rewards for their work. The routinization also takes the forms of regulating the recruitment process of new members and the allocation of powers and financial rewards to followers (Ibid., 367).
2.2. John Locke and the Right to Revolution

John Locke’s *Two Treatises of Government* was published anonymously in 1689, incented by Locke’s disagreement with the ideas laid by Sir Robert Filmer in his book *Patriarcha*. Both Locke’s and Filmer’s works were originated in the political context of the time, the struggle between the Whigs and Tories (Dunn, 1982, 45). The first part of Locke’s volume is a counterargument to Filmer’s work while the second part develops Locke’s political philosophy of civil society, based on the ideas of natural rights and contract theory. His objective was to refute the absolutist theory laid out by Filmer, and in *Two Treatises of Government* Locke gives the people the power to judge whether they have been infringed, and ultimately recognizes their right to revolt (Ibid., 48).

Locke begins his exploration from the state of nature, where all men are free, equal and able to decide upon their possessions and act as they see fit. No one has more than another and man is truly the master of himself. The law of nature, which applies to everyone, governs the state of nature and demands that no man should harm another’s life, health, liberty or possessions (Locke., 2012, 14, 16). As all men are the work of God, they belong to Him and are not to be harmed by one another. However, if a man disobeys these laws, anyone can act as a prosecutor and punish the transgressor as they see fit. It is only by punishing the offender, justly and calmly, that one man can lawfully harm another in the state of nature, and this right belongs to every man. Unfortunately man is a creature that is bound to err. If men were to act as judges in their own cases, rationality would most likely be overruled by passions and impartiality would be jeopardized. Civil government is the remedy Locke offers to these defects and to control the shortcomings of the state of nature, and it is because of the volatile circumstances of the state of nature that men decide give up certain rights to enter into political communities (Ibid, 6—9, 12).

Political societies are born out of a mutual agreement between men to unite into a community. In the state of nature men are in constant danger and cannot enjoy their properties safely and in peace. Men join civil society to mutually protect ‘their lives, liberties and estates’ (Ibid., 86). Civil society offers protection, peace and comfort for men to live in harmony with one another, and to safely enjoy their properties. For this reason men agree to remove themselves from the state of nature and to give up their individual powers to the community, which acts as one political power according to the will of the
majority (Ibid., 67, 69). Thus, the final reason for civil societies and governments is the preservation of property (Ibid., 87).

Because the preservation of property (in the broad sense that includes a man’s person and his liberties in addition to material possessions) is the purpose for the functioning of government, it must work towards the common good and should not violate the natural rights of its citizens. The government is required to protect everyone’s property, which in the state of nature was under constant threat and because the protection of property was the reason for entering into civil society in the first place. The end of governmental action should always be the good of the people (Ibid., 88—90), and the government cannot extend its powers outside of those that were given to every man in the state of nature. The law of nature is binding also in civil society, and the legislative does not hold any rights to arbitrary power. Legislative power extends solely to actions that ensure the good of the people (Ibid., 93—94). The preservation of property and acting for the good of the people serve as a constraint on government powers and dismisses authoritarian rule. Lockean idea of civil society and government has no room for absolute, arbitrary power since all power, for governmental actors too, is constrained to those powers that all men had in the state of nature (Ibid., 119). The rights to life, liberty and estate and their preservation act as the guiding principle also in the formation of the civil society and the government that were created to protect these rights. The only situation where a man can harm or kill another is when someone has attacked him. This is because by attacking another person the aggressor has entered into the state of war and given up his rights (Ibid., 120).

Since civil society has been created to preserve property, it follows that men need to have private property and that nobody has the right to take their possessions away from them. No prince or senate can take a man’s property without his consent. Locke agrees that mutual funds are needed to finance the services that protect men’s rights, but underlines that issues like taxation need to have majority backing. For if the government has the right impose taxes and to take as they wish, then what property does anyone truly have? A government that acts like this ‘invades the fundamental law of property, and subverts the end of government’ (Ibid., 97—99). A man’s right to property is inviolable to the extent that a government’s misuse of its powers by threatening its subjects’ natural rights provides a legitimate justification to overthrow it. Locke argues that whenever a government misuses the powers that have been given to it, it becomes a tyranny, regardless of whether the
power is misused by one person or many. When law is used to cause harm to another man, the person exceeding his powers renounces his position (Ibid., 138). As preservation of property is the sole motive for men entering into society, whenever the legislators violate this rule and attempt to somehow destroy people’s property, they place themselves into a state of war with the people, who are thus relieved from any duty to obey them. By violating the people’s rights, the government forfeits its right to power (Ibid., 149—150). Locke defends people’s right to revolution when their rights have been breached by the government (Ibid., 154).

2.3. David Beetham & the Legitimation of Power

The Legitimation of Power (1991) lays out David Beetham’s ideas on legitimacy, its relation to power and the legitimacy of power-holders. His main argument is that legitimacy needs to be comprehended as a multilayered concept that includes conformity to law, an expression of consent and acceptability of rules. Beetham believes that the advantage of this approach is the possibility to examine the reasons why legitimacy might not be achieved. *Illegitimate* is the term to mark a form of power that is acquired in manner that is against rules. *Legitimacy deficit* describes a situation where rules have only a faint justification in commonly accepted beliefs, and *delegitimation* is a process where consent is withdrawn (Beetham, 205—206).

Beetham argues that power that is gained through the breach of constitutional rules is illegitimate power. Examples of illegitimate power include revolutions, conquests and coup d’états. Illegitimate power is so called because it stands in clear opposition to conformity to law, which is the first condition of legitimacy. This manner of rising to power results in a particular set of problems. First, the breach of legality means that to justify this action there needs to be a claim to commonly accepted, extra-legal norms, and that the prevailing situation had been such that this kind of action could be acceptable. Because those who have breached the law in order to rise to power will afterwards require for the rule of law to be obeyed, they need to be able to provide credible reasons for others not to follow in their footsteps. Secondly, because there has been a break with the established constitutional system, a novel source of legitimacy must be found for the new system. Thus, *illegitimacy* includes at the same time the idea of shown illegality, a final rupture with the established constitutional order, and a process of relegitimation that might or might not be successful (Ibid., 206).
Legitimacy deficit on the other hand describes a situation where the constitutional order is not capable of solving persistent problems; or where the society and government fundamentally disagree on these issues; or where the constitutional order’s claim to power does not fit into the view of the acceptable source of political authority. There exist several different forms of a legitimacy deficit. Beetham describes a deficit that is caused by the source of political authority as ‘a divergence or discrepancy between the constitutional rules and the beliefs that should provide their justification’ (Ibid., 207). When the legitimacy deficit is related to ‘the ends or purposes of government,’ it can be distinguished as an inadequacy or incapacity of the government to successfully resolve pressing matters or to function effectively (Ibid., 207—208). To summarize, a legitimacy deficit describes a situation where the constitutional rules are not sufficient to provide authority or support to the rulers in case of government failure (Ibid., 209).

Delegitimation is a process that indicates the withdrawal of consent by those whose support is elementary for the legitimation of government. This can be demonstrated through acts of civil disobedience, for example through strikes and mass demonstrations. The greater the number of people participating in such acts or the more important the people’s cooperation is to the rulers, the graver the damage is to the government’s moral standing. It is, however, necessary to take into consideration the context of the given situation. In a liberal democracy opposition is an accepted characteristic of politics, and does not delegitimate the government. It is only when civil disobedience reaches such levels that its purpose is either to make the functioning of the government impossible, bring it down or show support for a whole different political order, that normal opposition moves into delegitimation. Delegitimation expresses that the government no longer has the consent of the citizenry to govern, and the government’s moral authority is in jeopardy. Beetham notes that for disobedient actions to matter, it is necessary for them to be known to a wide audience and take place publically. The withdrawal of consent can only have a delegitimating effect when it is generally known (Ibid., 209—210).

Beetham marks that the above mentioned ways through which government can lose its legitimacy are a natural continuation from his three-dimensional concept of legitimacy and that the ways are in practice connected. There is continuity between the three processes; a government failure together with a normative defect of constitutional rules initiates a process of delegitimation and loss of authority, which then leads to a seizure of power through a breach of the constitution. Beetham provides two ideal-types of processes that
lead to a change in constitutional order. The revolutionary process most often takes place in an authoritarian system, where the leadership lacks the people’s consent and where the citizenry does not have sufficiently room in the political process. An inadequate source of authority is the main element behind the government’s legitimacy deficit. It follows that some repressive government measure leads to wide protests that are outside the warranted limits of political expression and challenge the government’s authority. The government’s response through oppression only incites the situation. The final blow is when the armed forces and substantial branches join the movement. Now a new power can be established in the name of the people, and it should be legitimized through elections or continued mass mobilization (Ibid., 211—212).

The second kind of process, coup d’état, occurs under a democratic regime that fails to perform as expected and where the features of the political system come to be seen as part of the problem. Elections cannot solve the dilemma and only increase competition that harms the losers. Public opinion is increasingly pushed into sections with intentions to weaken the government’s authority. The problem here is not the exclusion of people from the political process, but just the opposite. Delegitimation, which is expressed through acts of civil disobedience and the withdrawal of consent, is used to undermine the government by groups with special interests. This is the context where a section of the military makes a coup d’état in the name of the people’s interests and to establish order (Ibid., 212).

2.4. Jean-Marc Coicaud, Legitimacy and Politics

In *Legitimacy and Politics* (2002) Jean-Marc Coicaud criticizes the idea that legality could serve as the ultimate standard for political legitimacy. He refutes notion that legal procedures might be accepted without justification or evaluation, since this would be incompatible with the concept of legitimacy. By setting the positive-legal order as the highest standard of political legitimacy, a submission to the State is implied, which goes against the whole idea of legitimacy. If legal is legitimate only for being legal, ‘the result is a passivity with regard to power that is the opposite of the spirit of legitimacy’ (Ibid., 22). He reasons this as follows:
• First, there would not be any difference between orders born out of voluntary agreements and imposed ones, and thus there would no longer be any room for obligation.

• Second, by only assessing laws through their formal characteristics, the reduction of legitimacy to legality empties the whole process of all meaning. As long as a law is adopted through accepted procedures, it is legitimate regardless whether its content may be arbitrary or illegitimate (Ibid, 18—22).

Coicaud argues that values and norms are an important part of political thought, and that it is in fact not even possible to exclude the normative dimension from political reflection. He defines legitimacy as the recognition of the right to govern. Consent, the common understanding of the rules and procedures of political life, plays a major role in the understanding of legitimacy. When consent is withdrawn, it signals a lack of political legitimacy. Consent is a necessary element for the right to govern, but it does not suffice in itself. Political legitimacy, in Coicaud’s words, ‘validates the relationship between individuals who command and those who obey,’ (Coicaud, 2002, 14) and it involves a common understanding of what is acceptable and what has been agreed on. There have to be shared values and norms that form the basis of what is the objective of the political action that those who command and those who obey have agreed on. Political action promotes those values that have been approved when consent was given (Ibid., 8—14).

A society’s values are expressed by its identity, and from this identity the society’s members take out their own qualities which are demonstrated also via actions. Out of all the values that constitute a society, only a small fraction is crucial to the community’s identity. These essential and basic values form the instrumental parts of a society’s identity and are inalienable. So much so, that an individual member of the community will feel a threat to these core values as a threat to his own identity. In a sense, these core values form a structure for both the life of an individual as well as for the collective life of the group and through guiding their actions, they also serve as fundamental norms. These norms form a criterion that is used to judge and evaluate reality and to guide actions. In this sense values include a normative element. When a value is connected to a way of acting or to an object, the value becomes a way of evaluating what is seemed as acceptable behavior. Coicaud also voices that values are hierarchical, with certain values forming the core of a society’s operation. The most universal values best signify the identity of the community (Ibid., 16—17). To preserve the society’s identity, the core values must not be
contradicted. Political action to organize a society is only legitimate when it follows the society’s identity. The core values cannot be violated, as they form the basis of the group’s existence (Ibid., 17—18).

In politics individual aspirations only become justified when these aspirations are presented as serving the people as a whole. Genuine political legitimacy is acquired through real concern with the group’s prosperity and success, and it cannot be separated from responsibility. Responsibility means accepting the constraints to one’s power when granted the right to govern. Political power must be justified by acting in the benefit of the group. All political leaders who wish to show they have the right to govern need to either satisfy, try to satisfy, or pretend to satisfy the needs of the group. The extent to which a political leader needs to take the groups’ wishes into considerations depends on the historical and cultural context of the situation. Therefore, the ruler needs to identify the public dimension of his activity as he is not able to do exactly as he pleases. The ruler is bound by his legitimacy in a sense that he cannot decide and act solely according his own interests, but must consider the interests of the greater group. He cannot act in a manner that would jeopardize the very survival of the community (Ibid., 33—35).

2.5 Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow, Contentious Politics

Charles Tilly’s and Sidney Tarrow’s theory of contentious politics focuses on the struggle among people over which political agenda will rule supreme. Contentious politics involves a web of interplays, where actors make demands over each other’s interests, resulting in coordinated activities promoting shared interests or ideas, in which states have the role of targets, third parties or the initiators of action. Together, contention, collective action and politics form the elementary parts of contentious politics (Tilly & Tarrow, 2007, 2, 4).

Contestation refers to actors making demands that touch the interests of someone else. They can involve multiple parties, but they always involve subjects, who make the demand, objects, who receive the demand, and claims. Coordinated effort on behalf of a common goal or interests is called collective action. The sphere of politics is encountered when the action involved government agents, either in direct action or through activities that are tied to governmental rights, interests or regulations. The presence or absence of governments in
contention is important for three reasons. First, governmental actors have advantages, for example the collection of taxes and the power to distribute resources, that other persons do not, and therefore political contention endangers the advantages of the persons possessing governmental power. Second, governments establish the rules that regulate contention; ‘who can make what collective claims, by what means, with what outcomes.’ As a result, they oppose anyone else constructing competing power centers. Third, powerful means of coercion, for example armies, police forces and prisons, are under government control. The government’s power to coerce involves the however slight possibility of violence, and brings an element that is missing from other spheres of action (Ibid., 4—5).

Tilly and Tarrow have also created a criterion for social movements. A social movement fuses ‘sustained campaigns of claim making’; different forms of public performances including demonstrations, public statements, rallies and lobbying; ‘public displays of worthiness, unity, number and commitment’ that occur in regular intervals, and which happens through methods such as displaying signs and picketing buildings. Lastly, they build on and their activities are sustained through social movement bases, i.e. organizations, solidarities, traditions and networks. Contentious politics, thus the locus where contention, politics and collective action meet, also leads to the emergence of collective claims. The combination of power, shared interest and government policy means that the issues touch more than one individual, leading to collective claim-making which requires a level of coordination among people. The presence of governments means that the claim-making becomes political. Therefore, Tilly and Tarrow name the groups that make claims as political actors, and the collective names they use as their political identities. Tilly and Tarrow argue that ‘all forms of contention rest on performances’, and that those performances can be adapted to suit the specific sphere of action, taking advantage of the specific symbols and practices that resonate to the local population. These are called modular performances for their ability to be modified to suit particular circumstances. Repertoires of contention is a term to illustrate how people sometimes rely on certain claim-making routines that are particular to a certain place, time and pairing of claim-maker and claim-receiver. Claim-makers work within sets of repertoires typical to their place, time and pair, and these repertoires make use of the history of past struggles (Ibid., 8—17).

Contentious politics contains different modes and mixtures of collective action, and it exposes intricate social processes. In order to analyze a social process, three steps are
needed. First, there needs to be a description of the process, second, it must be broken down to its basic causes, and third, these causes need to be reconstructed to a general account to explain how the process took place. Political actors, political identities, repertoires of contention and contentious performances form a basic guide for the analysis of processes. Further concepts are also needed. *Mechanisms* are ‘a delimited class of events that alter relations among specified sets of elements in identical or closely similar ways over a variety of situations.’ Mechanisms aggregate into *processes*, which are ‘regular combinations and sequences of mechanisms that produce similar (generally more complex and contingent) transformations of those elements.’ Different processes include different sequences and mixtures of mechanisms that interactively generate some outcome (Ibid., 27—29).

The dynamics of contention can be analyzed through a mechanism-process procedure by (1) breaking a familiar process into its component mechanisms to understand what makes it functional; (2) comparing how a process works in different contexts to understand whether the presence or absence of a specific mechanism has any effect; (3) studying whether specific mechanisms concur in such regular intervals and leading to similar conclusions as to form a potent process. Three of the most common mechanisms found in contentious politics are brokerage, diffusion and coordinated action. *Brokerage* signifies the creation of a new link between previously unlinked places of activity, whereas *diffusion* means the expansion of a form of contention, an issue or a manner of framing it from one place of activity to another. *Coordinated action* occurs when two or more actors immerse themselves in mutual signaling and parallel claim-making on the same target. In addition to the above-mentioned three, Tarrow and Tilly have identified four other mechanisms. *Social appropriation* is the transformation of nonpolitical groups into political actors by taking advantage of their organizational and institutional bases to initiate movement campaigns. *Boundary activation* refers to the forging of a new boundary or the solidification of an existing one between challenging groups and their targets. When an external party indicates its willingness to acknowledge and support the existence and demands of a political actor, it is called *certification*. Finally, *identity shift* is used to identify a situation where ‘formation of new identities within challenging groups whose coordinated action brings them together and reveals their commonalities’ (Ibid., 31,34).

Mechanisms can lead to processes, and two of the most concurrent ones Tilly and Tarrow have identified are *mobilization* and *demobilization*. By the former they mean the situation
where people who previously had stayed outside the contentious action began making claims, and the latter refers to the opposing situation where people who were making claims stop doing so. Tilly’s and Tarrow’s method of identifying mechanism and processes for the study of social movements enables the creation of an explanatory framework to answer such questions as how are political actors formed, how do political identities change and what causes streams of contention to transform into sustained social movements (Ibid., 34, 43).

3. France’s Contentious Identity

‘Bref, à mon sens, la France ne peut être la France sans la grandeur.’ Charles de Gaulle

I will argue that there were four separate elements that construed de Gaulle’s legitimacy. Together they allowed de Gaulle to become a legitimate leader, despite him rising to power outside democratic norms. I will introduce the elements in somewhat chronological historical order, though at times events overlap. The first theme, France’s Contentious Identity, provides the setting and groundwork for the following themes and historical events and is set in the time period before the start of the war. France’s tradition with contentious politics is an elementary part of the birth of the Resistance and of de Gaulle’s stand to oppose Vichy. Then I will focus on the Vichy Government and its formation, which happened in the summer of 1940. The third theme is the French Resistance, its formation and subsequent cooperation with de Gaulle, who had initiated his own opposition when he refused to accept the Vichy government’s armistice with Germany. The final theme, Charisma, details de Gaulle as a person and focuses on his leadership style and actions both before, during and after the war. It is my belief that all these elements together were necessary to build de Gaulle’s legitimacy, and that he could not have acquired the legitimacy he did if one of them would have been missing.

A country’s constitution aims to reflect the nation’s core values and identities, which is why a deviation from these rules marks a breach of the nation’s core identity. The French revolution, its insistence on individual liberties and the country’s historical status as a power state are all key features of France. The Declaration of the Rights of Man (1789)

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6 de Gaulle, 1954, 1
states that ‘[t]he aim of all political association is the preservation of the natural and imprescriptible rights of man. These rights are liberty, property, security, and resistance to oppression’ and it is against this normative and ideological backdrop against which the events must be viewed.

France, its history and national identity provide the context in which the formation of the Vichy government and de Gaulle’s subsequent cooperation with the Resistance took place, and explain why and how events evolved. When evaluating legitimacy, it is necessary to pay attention to the historical and cultural tradition of a given country. In some other nation, where consensus and obedience would have played a greater part in the nation’s identity, this kind of disobedience that de Gaulle and the Resistance displayed would not have gathered support from the general public. The Nordic countries, for example, have a history of consensus-building which is rooted in the Lutheran tradition embracing the ideas of stability and continuity. The good life is one lived in unison and in accordance to a set of consolidated moral norms. In the Nordic countries there also exists a culture of deep cohesion with the state, avoiding the pitfall of a profound dichotomy between civil society and government (Stenius, 2010, 50—51). This emphasis on consensus and unison means that generally acceptable forms of contention differ greatly from those applicable in France. On the contrary, France has a history of contention, which Charles Tilly has studied in his book *The Contentious French*. Tracing back four centuries, Tilly identifies forms and elements of the French collective action that form a part of the country’s identity. In *Contention & Democracy in Europe, 1650-2000* Tilly lists seven serious regime crises and transitions that occurred in France after the Restoration of 1815 and continuing to 1968. France experienced serious contentious action in regular intervals, and adopted group action to its national identity. When placed into a situation they disagreed with, the French people rely on different repertoires of contentious action. Viewed from this perspective, France’s contentious tradition birthed the Free French and de Gaulle.

### 3.1. Defeatism versus Grandeur

De Gaulle was deeply impressed by the France which he grew up in and this sense of national pride marked him throughout his life. Like his compatriots, he was very proud of his homeland’s achievements and deemed nationalism as the ‘most generous and disinterested’ of sentiments. He often quoted a saying by the militant polemist Paul
Déroulède; ‘the man who does not love his mother more than other mothers and his country more than other countries loves neither his mother nor his country’ (Fenby, 2010, 48—49). There was also another national sentiment that came to have a deep impact on him, and this was the concern that, despite all the positive, the French nation was in decline and its citizens were not able to live up to the grandeur that France should exhibit. This feeling enforced de Gaulle’s understanding of himself as a man who would be needed to save his motherland (Ibid., 49).

After the First World War de Gaulle continued his career in the military and carried on developing his ideas on the modernization of the French army. In 1934 de Gaulle’s third book, Vers l’armée de métier, was published. The volume was a turning point in the French military tradition, attacking the official doctrine, and discussed the creation of a professional army and the development of mechanized armed forces. The key was to induce modern warfare through the use of tanks, and to include forces that would be free to attack and move quickly and with an element of surprise. De Gaulle was pushing for modern, mechanized armed forces for France, but was met with great resistance. Despite some positive feedback in the press, military leaders condemned his thoughts that broke the static defense strategy that prevailed at the time. Between the years 1931 and 1935, France cut its military spending by 32 per cent. Later, at the end of the war in 1945, a copy of Vers l’armée de métier with favorable annotations was found at Hitler’s headquarters (Lacouture, 1990, 214, Fenby, 2010, 99, 101—103).

During the 1930’s de Gaulle was looking for a political ally to push forward his ideas about modernizing the military and first met Paul Reynaud, the future prime minister of France, at the end of 1934. Reynaud became interested in de Gaulle’s thoughts, and during the next six years de Gaulle was to write over seventy letters to him. The events on the Continent furthered Reynaud’s interest in de Gaulle’s ideas. Hitler was growing bolder, and repudiated the military clauses of the treaty of Versailles while France did nothing in turn. De Gaulle fed Reynaud confidential military information about the enemy’s movements and expressed his frustration of witnessing Germany modernize its army while France stood idle (Fenby., 2010, 106—107) Reynaud’s support was not enough, however, to change the mood in the country and the opposition to de Gaulle remained high at the Defence Ministry. De Gaulle was so unpopular, that even the mention of his name received scorns from the generals (Ibid., 109).
In January 1940 de Gaulle continued to try to push his ideas across by publishing a pamphlet called *L’avénement de la force mécanique*. In the pamphlet he cautioned of a moral, political, social and economic crisis that would cause great unrest and shake the basis of the state itself, to which mechanized forces would be the only solution. He had the pamphlet sent to 800 persons of authority, but, despite a few positive reactions, the majority of the leadership remained hostile to his ideas. In March the same year there was some success in the political field, as the government was forced to resign by a parliamentary vote and the president asked Paul Reynaud to form the new government, making him the Prime Minister. Reynaud’s position was to be volatile, however, as he managed to gain a majority of just one vote. This meant a constant struggle between the different factions of government at a time when strong leadership would have been needed. His mistress complicated things further for being pro-German and meddling in the affairs of the state. Reynaud wished to appoint de Gaulle as Secretary to the War Cabinet, but very strong opposition by the Defence Minister forced him to offer the position to a banker who was on the forefront of advocating peace with Germany (Ibid., 120—122).

In May 1940 German armed forces attacked the heavily fortified Maginot Line and demolished the French forces through using a combination of tanks and divebombers, which led the French forces to either retreat or to find themselves surrounded by the quickly moving enemy. This was all the more humiliating since the French forces were widely thought to be the most professional and forceful in the world. The two sides were evenly matched when it came to men and equipment, but the Germans dominated with their aggressive and innovative military strategy (Cobb, 2009, 9-12).

De Gaulle remained in opposition for his desire for more proactive and aggressive military tactics, and for his belief in continued fighting. For de Gaulle, the signing of an armistice was unthinkable and would violate his motherland’s integrity and well-being (Fenby, 2010, 20). However, less than two months after the aggressions had begun and led by Marshal Pétain, the Vichy government signed an armistice with the Germans on June 22, 1940. With this action France moved under the control of the enemy and also broke its previous commitments to Great Britain and other allies. Historically speaking, this was unprecedented. De Gaulle wrote:

> For me, the capital error of Pétain and his government had been to conclude with the enemy, in the name of France, the so-called “armistice.” Certainly,
at the time this was signed the battle in Metropolitan France had been indisputably lost. To cease fire between the Atlantic and the Alps, to bring the debacle to an end would have been entirely justified as a military and local action. The command of the forces concerned was responsible to the government until its leadership had changed. That government might have reached Algiers, taking with it the treasure of French sovereignty which for fourteen centuries had never been surrendered, continuing the battle, keeping its word to the Allies, and demanding their aid in return. But to have retired from the war with the empire intact, the fleet untouched, the air force largely undamaged; to have withdrawn our African and Levantine troops without a single soldier lost; to have abandoned all those forces which, in France itself, could be transported elsewhere; to have broken our alliances; above all, to have submitted the state to the Reich’s discretion (de Gaulle, 1998, 951).

When de Gaulle departed to Britain in a refusal of the armistice, he was alone. His Mémoires de Guerre remember the loneliness he felt, but also express his deep belief in destiny and in his role as the savior of France. One night de Gaulle was dining at a friend’s residence, and the hostess asked how long he expected his mission to last. ‘Madame,’ de Gaulle answered, ‘I am not here on a mission. I am here to save the honour of France’ (Fenby, 2010, 30).

3.2. Honour

The quick surrender of the Vichy government and its consequent cooperation with Nazi Germany left its mark on France. Shannon Fogg (2009) describes how the Vichy government’s attempts to justify subsequent material shortages, especially food shortages, to a moral imperative that had kept spirits relatively high during WWI, failed. After only six weeks of fighting, references to an abstract good of the nation did not resonate with the public. In an essay published in the Foreign Affairs in October 1941, René Cassin writes about the resistance’s common ideals ‘to save French honor, to defend the French Empire, to free France, and to give back their liberties to the French people.’7 Vichy government’s rapid surrender was argued to be a dishonorable defeat that pushed people to join the resistance, especially considering the unused resources of the vast French empire. In Mémoires de Guerre de Gaulle remarks that ‘for fourteen centuries, military power had been second nature to France’ and ‘the image of themselves the French had always had, the world’s opinion of them, the testimony of history itself, had suddenly been abolished,

7 ‘Vichy or the Free France?’ by René Cassin. Published in the Foreign Affairs in the October 1941 issue. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/70123/rene-cassin/vichy-or-free-france

Sakari Hänninen (1998) writes that identities can well be seen as either social, political, economic, historical, cultural, or symbolic constructs. The past, too, can be seen as the ‘place’ of identity. The formation of an identity can be traced back to the local tradition, where it often, but not necessarily, is placed parallel to the local mentality. When interpreting the formation of an identity like this, the dynamics of the togetherness of the group is emphasized (Hänninen, 1998, 7). The Vichy government and its conduct during the war period were a breach to the identity of the French people and the society’s togetherness, remaining sensitive topics in France. Coicaud, who is French himself, notes the difficulty modern France has with recognizing the collaborationist and anti-Semitic behavior of this time. He writes that the acknowledgment of ‘these acts is to recognize that France betrayed a certain idea of itself’ (Coicaud, 2002, 135).

Matthew Cobb (2009) writes that even worse than the material shortages and loss of democratic rights that the armistice inflicted upon the French people, was the moral and political impact that the Vichy government’s participation in the Holocaust caused. The sensitivity of the topic is visible in a court case which was the result of a one-page advertisement praising Philippe Pétain that was published in the newspaper Le Monde in 1984. The advertisement declared that Pétain and the Vichy government had in fact worked towards securing the Allied victory and the protection of France, which the French people had shamefully forgotten. The publication was paid for and worded by two former officials of the Vichy administration, and it resulted in a court case where the two as well as the publishers of Le Monde were accused of defending the crime of collaboration with the enemy. Found guilty in France, the case was taken before the European Court of Human Rights by the defendants as a breach of their right to freedom of expression. The Court’s final judgment included the French government’s submission, which stated that ‘this page of the history of France remains very painful in the collective memory, given the difficulties the country experienced in determining who was responsible, whether isolated individuals or entire institutions, for the policy of collaboration with Nazi Germany’. The Court agreed with the defendants by fifteen votes to six, giving its decision in 1998 and agreeing that indeed their right to freedom of expression had been breached. In addition,
the Court noted that every country needs to be able to discuss its past openly and impartially, even those events that could bring back painful memories (Case of Lehideux and Isorni v. France (55/1997/839/1045)).

The Vichy government had been formed hastily, and after the war the contested way of its formation enabled France to distance itself from wartime atrocities and blame the Nazis for the mass deportations of Jews. Not until the mid-1990’s when Jacques Chirac (a known Gaullist) took office had a French president admitted the French state’s role in the events. Former presidents had distanced the crimes committed from the French state, and laid the blame to the Vichy regime, which had been declared illegal after the war. In a speech given within two month of stepping into office, Chirac acknowledged that France was responsible for the crimes committed against Jews but referred also to the nobler story of wartime France that had been provided by de Gaulle. Chirac spoke of de Gaulle and ‘the France that was never at Vichy’, and continued that this France was always ‘correct, generous, faithful to its traditions, to its spirit’. The Vichy government had violated the values and norms of the French society, and had thus attacked the core identity of the nation, in the process losing its own legitimacy. Monique Clague (1975) also notes the role French history played in forming de Gaulle’s leadership style. She argues that due to all the events the country has faced, French leadership had fluctuated between crisis and routine authority, a situation where strong personal leadership has been both welcomed and then eventually rejected. This circle led to a dualism in de Gaulle’s leadership, as he relied both on charisma and legality to support his position.

In Mémoires de Guerre L’Appel 1940-1942 de Gaulle writes of his thoughts when he departed for England:

Je pensais, en effet, que c’en serait fini de l’honneur, de l’unité, de l’indépendance, s’il devait être entendu que, dans cette guerre mondiale, seule la France aurait capitulé et qu’elle en serait restée là. Car, dans ce cas, quelle que dût être l’issue du conflit, que le pays, décidément vaincu, fût un jour débarrassé de l’envalisseur par les armes étrangères qui il demeurât asservi, le dégoût qu’il aurait de lui-même et celui qu’il inspirerait aux autres empoisonneraient son âme et sa vie pour de longues générations (de Gaulle, 1954, 69)

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The country’s history with contention was contradictory to the defeatist spirit that had taken over the French leadership, and the resurrection myth de Gaulle created for France enabled the nation to rise from the abyss after the war. A quick surrender was not natural for France. Tilly (1986) lists the various forms of contention that has penetrated the French history forming a part of the country’s identity, from three revolutions to countless acts of contention ranging from strikes to barricades and demonstrations. Previous struggles form the repertoire of contention that is acceptable in a given community, and the French history is filled with examples of claim-making. In a state where even today people take the streets to protest for what they see important, the emergence of a resistance, especially when an armistice was agreed after such a short period of struggle against the enemy, was to be expected. Tilly and Tarrow (2007) note that acts of contention make use of different elements of social life, of elements like identities, organizational forms and social ties. These elements create both the collective claims that groups and individuals make as well as the methods they use to make those claims. Through observing and participating in acts of contention people learn which interplays can lead to a political difference and also the shared meanings of those interplays. Legitimacy connotes a level of acceptance that a certain thing is (morally) right. A thing, be it a person, an act, or a group, cannot be legitimate if it is deemed as wrong, as something that is against or outside of what is commonly accepted. Therefore, given the long history of contention in France and how widely contentious repertoires have been used across the populace I would argue that contention is a legitimate feature of the French common life.

The importance of de Gaulle’s personal determination and effort in the development of post-war France cannot be overestimated. Gregor Dallas (2005) draws a parallel between Vichy France and Fascist Italy; both countries’ foreign policy was dictated by their collaboration with Hitler; domestic policy failure was due to unsuccessful attempts to establish functioning local administration to carry out the policies. Both French and Italian citizens were taken to Germany for forced labor, and in both countries Jews were persecuted. Resistance movement was active in both states, and the heads of government (Marshal Pétain in France and Pietro Badoglio in Italy) were war heroes of First World War who negotiated with the Allies and Germany as the end of the war drew close. But as Dallas notes, ‘the Italians did not have a de Gaulle’. Italy would suffer greatly in the aftermath of the war. Famed British war reporter Alan Moorehead, who was stationed in
Naples in 1943 commented how ‘It was not the war, it was the aftermath of the war that destroyed Italy’ (Dallas, 2005, 97—98). In Naples Moorehead observed, as the Allied troops passed, the ‘moral collapse of a people. They had no pride any more, or any dignity. The animal struggle for existence governed everything. Food. That was the only thing that mattered’ (Ibid., 98).

On the contrary, a French opinion poll held at the end of 1944 reported that 64 per cent of the French people thought that France had already redeemed its place among the Great Powers. De Gaulle’s insistence on the greatness of his country allowed France and the French people a form of purification after the war, to forget the crimes committed by the Vichy regime and the defeatist spirit of its citizens. Instead, they were able to circle around this lonesome hero figure, who by the strength of his conviction had provided a decree of dignity to his motherland (Fenby, 2010, 283, Gardner, 1990, 20—21). De Gaulle allowed France to see itself the way it wanted, and to close its eyes to the shameful events of the war. In 2000 a statue was raised in his honor in Paris, with President Chirac referring to de Gaulle as ‘France incarnate’.  

Lacouture (1990, 215) offers an adept description of de Gaulle: ‘[a] character who believes himself to be so profoundly in tune with the national interest that he finds a justification for each one of his actions and who does not consider any proceedings unworthy if they are of such a kind as to ensure the triumph of his arguments – the arguments being legitimate since he himself was legitimacy.’ However outrageous, de Gaulle’s embodiment of the core values of France enabled the country to survive the war, and to proceed to nation-building post-war. Because of the historical and cultural traditions of France, the Vichy government’s conduct deviated to a large degree from accepted norms. In the context of France, these kinds of violations were more damaging, as the national identity of the country had been rooted in the idea of the rights of man, and where the purpose of the government was to preserve these rights, not violate them. De Gaulle offered a way out by embodying the core values in his own persona. He wrote: ‘[a] call to honor from the depths of history, as well as the instinct of the nation itself, had led me to bear responsibility in default of heirs: to assume French sovereignty. It was I who held the legitimacy. It was in its name that I could call the nation to war and to unity, impose order,

9 As quoted in ‘De Gaulle honored at last’ by Jon Henley for the Guardian http://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/nov/10/jonhenley
law and justice, demand from the world respect for the rights of France’ (de Gaulle, 1998, 665). After the war, he declined to follow the historic tradition of declaring a republic from Hôtel de Ville’s balcony. There was no need for this, he declared, as the republic had never dissolved, it had just been exiled in his persona (Tilly, 1986, 334). De Gaulle’s insistence on being France bordered and even crossed the outrageous, yet he succeeded in making others too believe that he was France incarnate.

4. Vichy Government

‘Car, toujours, le chef est seul en face du mauvais destin ’ Charles de Gaulle

The previous chapter discussed de Gaulle’s struggle as he tried to push for the modernization of the armed forces and continued resistance as well as the defeatist spirit of the French leadership that led to the signing of an armistice with Germany. Using Coicaud’s idea that societies have core values that must not be contradicted if legitimacy is to be held, I argued that the defeatist spirit of the French leadership and the abuse the Vichy regime conducted on its subjects was in violation of the French historical and cultural tradition and thus broke the society’s core values. De Gaulle’s insistence on saving France’s honour and freeing the French people, on the other hand, enabled the country to successfully rise from the disasters of the war.

My argument is that de Gaulle’ legitimation process is sequential; in order for de Gaulle to gain legitimacy, Vichy had to lose some of its legitimacy first. Following Beetham’s theory on revolutions and legitimacy (Beetham, 1991, 205), the loss of legitimacy was a multi-dimensional process where one event led to another. In a context where there cannot exist two legitimate authorities at the same time, it is necessary for the ruling authority to experience a loss of legitimacy before another power can step into its place and gain legitimacy. A situation that deals with the legitimate rule of a nation, the concepts of legitimate authority and rule necessarily contain the notion that there is only one source of power, and, ultimately, only one authority whom to obey. This is a hierarchical understanding that allows a society to function efficiently. Thus I will begin the analysis by outlining the historical events that led to the formation of the Vichy government, and its

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10 de Gaulle, 1954, 65
consequent behavior. Using the perspectives by the previously mentioned theorists, I will explore why the Vichy government was not a legitimate authority. It was the Vichy government’s lack of legitimacy that opened a gap for de Gaulle to rise into a position of authority.

4.1. The Rise and Fall of Vichy

Hitler invaded Poland in September 1939, and by May the following year German forces had moved to Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg (Fenby, 2010, 118, 122). In London, the forceful Winston Churchill followed Neville Chamberlain as Prime Minister but in France the political leadership was broken. The French Prime Minister Reynaud was exhausted; he had lost his willingness to continue the battle and told Churchill that the fight was lost. During their meeting in Paris Churchill was to learn how deep the sentiment of defeat was amongst the French. Reynaud had been forced to take control over the Defense Ministry himself and brought in noted generals and heroes of the First World War, Marshal Philippe Pétain and Maxime Weygand, who favored armistice with Germany. While Churchill continued to push on, most of the French leaders were looking for a way out of the situation as soon as possible (Ibid., 14, 122—123).

On 14 June, 1940 the Germans arrived to Paris. Marshal Pétain insisted that France should begin talks of armistice with Hitler. In the meantime, de Gaulle had arrived to England where he had met up with Jean Monnet, the future ‘Father of Europe’, who had formed a proposal for a Franco-British union that would enable the French to keep on fighting against Hitler. The British Cabinet approved the union, which would join the two countries in their ‘unyielding resolution in their common defence of justice and freedom, against subjection to a system which reduces mankind to a life of robots and slaves’ (Fenby, 2010, 22—25). Elated, Reynaud promised to fight for the proposal till the end. However, the appeasers caught whiff of the plan and strongly rebuked this plot for the British to take over their country. In the end, the proposal of a Franco-British union fell aside without a vote, leading Reynaud to resign from his post as Prime Minister. Pétain was then asked to form a government (Lacouture, 1990, 204—206). As soon as de Gaulle heard the news that Pétain would become the Prime Minister, he understood that this would mean that France
would agree to an armistice with Germany. De Gaulle was not ready to accept defeat and immediately decided to return back to Britain (de Gaulle, 1954, 65).

June 22nd, 1940 saw the signing of an armistice between Germany and France. The terms involved were tough. France was to pay the expenses of the occupation forces at a highly inflated rate, which added up to 55 per cent of national revenue. The region of Alsace-Lorraine was annexed, and the franc was devalued by 20 per cent. Germany controlled those parts of the country that included the majority of France’s industry and mineral resources. The armistice resulted in the real power lying with the Germans, with the Pétain government providing a useful apparatus behind which to hide. The terms also included a clause which stated that when requested, the French would agree to hand over political prisoners to the Nazis (Lacouture, 1990, 232—233, Fenby, 2010, 36).

The newly formed Vichy government built its ideological base around the traditional values of Travail, Famille, Patrie (Work, Family, Fatherland). Women were encouraged to focus on their work at home with family being the upholding pillar of the system. Democratic principles were pushed aside and repressive measures were adopted. The Catholic Church gained prominence and youth movements were initiated to raise support for the government. High-ranking politicians, among them the former Prime Minister Paul Reynaud, were arrested. Even some street names were changed to better suit the new mood of the nation. The Vichy government soon began to take advantage of the anti-Semitic sentiment in France that had begun to take place after the Dreyfus affair. Initially Jews were prohibited from state employment and from working in companies that received funding from the government. Later legislation ordered for them to be excluded from all professions and for their assets to be confiscated (Ibid., 144).

Hitler’s interest in France was due to the country being a useful source of money and resources to Germany, whose economy was strained due to the war. By the year 1943 France contributed 9 per cent of Germany’s gross domestic product through its annual state payments. Food and industrial machinery were also provided, with the French auto manufacturers Citroën and Renault producing 30,000 vehicles a year for the occupiers.

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11 I use the terms Pétain government and Vichy government interchangeably
12 Alfred Dreyfus (1859-1935) was a Jewish captain who was wrongly convicted for treason in 1894. The Dreyfus affair divided the public opinion in France. He was acquitted of all charges in 1906 (Fenby, 2010, 676).
France was also a significant source of weapons and military aircraft. After 1942 the supply of resources began to include French people. *Service du Travail Obligatoire* was a program which conscripted workers from France to Germany. The program evolved from a scheme where the Vichy regime was exchanging three workers for every prisoner of war freed by the Germans. Overall, it is estimated that 4.5 million French people were taken to work in Germany. *Service du Travail Obligatoire* increased the support for the resistance movement, as young men escaped to the mountains to avoid being taken to Germany. The Alps, the Massif central and the Pyrenees hosted thousands of young men, who naturally needed nutrition and weapons to defend themselves. They were able to care for themselves through raids, and often targeted offices of the *Service du Travail Obligatoire* where they destroyed draft files. Through this, a *guerrilla* was born. (Fenby, 2010, 213, Paxton, 1972, 292—293).

Increasingly, repressive measures by the government grew more common. In Paris, thugs were used by the authorities to track down and kill dissidents. In 1943 *Militia*, a paramilitary force, was created to work together with the Germans to fight the resistance. The Jewish population in France numbered around 330,000 people, of whom 190,000 were citizens. The political Right had been using anti-Semitism as a propaganda tool for decades, and, given that many Jews were first-generation immigrants, the political arena did not include any actors protecting their rights. Vichy announced anti-Jewish legislation in August 1940 and in March the next year the regime promulgated the launch of a General Commissariat for Jewish Questions. In 1942 some pro-German press in the northern zones of the country began to talk about ‘a final reckoning for the Jews’, who had been denied the right to work and were banned from public places. Jews were made to wear Star of David patches, and the persecution even extended to Jewish veterans of the First World War. Round-ups were initiated in May 1941 and grew pace the following year, when 5,800 women, 4,000 children and 3,000 men were seized from their homes. The operation was planned and executed jointly by the Gestapo, SS and the French national police. The detainees were eventually transported to Auschwitz. German troops destroyed a village in the Limousin region of France, killing 642 men, women and children. Deportations of Jews from France began in August 1942, with the French Police and the SS working side by side in Marseille, where the round-ups were classified as ‘moral cleansing.’ As a whole, approximately 75,000 Jews were deported from France to concentration camps during the war (Fenby, 2010, 215—216, Fogg, 2009, 10).
After the Liberation, the Pétain regime vanished. There were no proponents of Pétain and nobody spoke on behalf of collaborators. Associates acted as if he had never existed. De Gaulle discarded any legitimacy for the Vichy government, and argued that the Republic had been moved abroad for the war period and was embodied in his persona. Nevertheless, a considerable pressure to punish the collaborators mounted. This came especially strong from the Communists, who exaggeratingly claimed that the Germans and Vichy had executed 75,000 of their members. Terrible acts of violence were committed against persons perceived to have been collaborators; some prostitutes who had welcomed German customers were kicked to death, mobs executed accused collaborators and women who had slept with Germans had their hair cropped and were forced to walk through the streets half naked and painted with swastikas. De Gaulle’s priority was to bring the purge under the Justice Ministry and 126,000 people were detained. Approximately half of the detainees were released without any punishment, with four per cent of trials ending in death penalties. Most sentences, however, were *in absentia*, with 767 people actually being executed. Of the 1,554 death sentences that were presented to de Gaulle, he commuted 998 (Fenby, 2010, 273).

In March 1945, a High Court that had been set up to try member of the Vichy regime decided to adjudicate Pétain. The return of the workers sent to Germany for forced labor and the rise of evidence of Vichy’s conduct hardened the public opinion against Pétain. Emotions were tense when the trial opened, with Pétain being charged for treason and for plotting against the state. Matters like forced labor, the establishment and crimes committed by the paramilitary force the *Milice*, or the persecution of the Jewish population were not mentioned. These issues were not raised for the fear of disturbing the post-Liberation consensus and for maintaining public order, as de Gaulle grimly worked towards achieving his view of post-war France. Pétain received the death penalty, and was also sentenced to national indignity. The penalty was not carried out, however, because de Gaulle decided to commute the death sentence (de Gaulle, 1998, 952).
4.2. Delegitimation of Government

The Vichy government’s legitimacy can be studied from several perspectives. Here, I will first focus on its legality, followed by a discussion on the normative justification for legitimate rule. In October 1941, French Nobel laureate René Cassin’s article ‘Vichy or Free France?’ was published in *Foreign Affairs*. Cassin, a professor of law and an ardent supporter of the resistance, argues for the legitimacy of the Free French Forces over the Vichy government. Cassin’s argument involves both the legal and normative aspects of legitimacy. He claims that the newly created Vichy government is ‘both illegal and illegitimate’ and thus bases his argument on both legal and moral grounds. From a jurisdictional perspective, Cassin declares the Vichy government to be illegal since:

(1) The National Assembly met hastily and under irregular conditions which effectively denied it freedom of assembly and of discussion. (2) The National Assembly – the only body vested by the laws of 1875 with the right to alter the Constitution – did not exercise this right but abdicated it in favor of an authority without legal standing. It violated its own *raison d’être* and committed suicide. The country had nothing to say about this proceeding and was not asked to ratify it. (3) The “Government of the Republic” thus empowered to revise the Constitution had no more legal standing than the organ that delegated such power to it. And in abolishing “the republican form of government” it proceeded in violation of the formal text of the 1884 Constitution.

In *the Second Treatise of Government* Locke touches also the subject of delegated powers while discussing the limits of legislative power, and argues that because legislative powers are delegated powers directly coming from the people, they cannot be transferred to the hands of any other party. It is only the people who have the right to choose the legislative, and once this choice has been made, it is only these individuals that have the authority to make laws and govern. The chosen legislative does not have any right to transfer their authority to any other hands (Locke, 2012, 99). So from the legal perspective, Locke’s position is similar to Cassin’s argument that the Vichy regime was illegal since the formation of the government had occurred through the abdication of rights. Writing at a time when the events were playing out and motivated politically by de Gaulle’s quest,

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13 ‘Vichy or the Free France?’ by René Cassin. Published in the *Foreign Affairs* in the October 1941 issue. [http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/70123/rene-cassin/vichy-or-free-france](http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/70123/rene-cassin/vichy-or-free-france)

14 Ibid.
Cassin aims to refute the Vichy regime’s legitimacy by denying it any legality. As discussed in the previous chapter, after the war this same argument about the contentious formation of the Vichy government allowed France to distance itself from wartime crimes. Because the Vichy government had been recognized as the ruling authority of France by other states and since de Gaulle had no legal claim to his position, it was necessary for Cassin to try to refute the legality of Vichy before making an appeal on the moral ground. It is not entirely clear, however, what the actual proceedings were when Vichy was formed, and thus when evaluating its legitimacy it is necessary to look into other elements besides legality.

As mentioned in the introduction, I do not believe it sufficient to focus only on the legal understanding of legitimacy. I understand legitimacy as multidimensional concept that has both a moral, normative and legal dimension. It can be argued that Vichy rose to power through a breach on constitutional rules; however, there is another, and in my opinion a more important, dimension to the regime’s lack of legitimacy. To focus solely on legality is not enough to truly grasp the meaning of legitimacy. Glenn Moots and Greg Forster (2010) also criticize the use of democratic processes and thus legality as the ultimate standard for legitimacy in their article ‘Salus populi suprema lex: John Locke Versus Contemporary Democratic Theory.’ They condemn modern democratic theorists for being silent on the issue of where democratic processes come from in practice, and for brushing aside the fact that deliberative procedures have in effect been instituted by a priori non-deliberative procedures. Moots and Forster believe it is needed for these procedures to be justified before proceeding further with subsequent theorizing, and they call for any theory that holds a democratic process as an ultimate basis of legitimacy, as opposed to an instrumental value, to answer to the following counterstatements:

1. If a democratic process is considered as the ultimate basis of legitimacy, then democratic processes are the only way through which a political institution can be instituted legitimately.
2. Democratic processes are also political institutions.
3. Therefore a democratic process can only be instituted legitimately through a democratic process.
4. It is not possible to institute the democratic process through a democratic process, because it cannot exist before being instituted.
5. Therefore, if a democratic process is the ultimate standard of legitimacy, democratic processes cannot be instituted legitimately.

The argument above is focused on the creation of democratic processes on where they are not yet in existence, while the following argument applies to existing democratic processes:

1. If a democratic process is considered as the ultimate basis of legitimacy, then the democratic process is the only way through which political disputes can be resolved legitimately.
2. A political dispute can also be about the democratic process itself.
3. Therefore, a dispute about the democratic process can only be solved legitimately by the democratic process itself.
4. It is not possible to work out a dispute over a process by using that process itself.
5. Therefore, if a democratic process is the ultimate standard of legitimacy, it is not possible to legitimately resolve political disputes over the democratic process itself (Moots and Forster, 2010, 36—37).

Moots and Forster argue that until these issues are addressed, democratic theory cannot be seen to offer an exhaustive theory of legitimacy. They suggest for a decisive norm to guide democratic processes and to provide a criterion through which to evaluate these processes. This norm legitimizes the democratic process from the outside by laying down a substantive value that stands above the democratic process (Ibid., 42).

In the *Two Treatises of Government* Locke holds that all men have the natural right to life, liberty and estate and that civil society was formed to protect these rights. Because a government could not possess any more powers or rights than an individual in the state of nature, Locke held that a government that violated the natural rights of the people loses its legitimacy and can be overthrown. There can only be one supreme authority in a political community, but the people continue holding the ultimate right to remove or make changes in the government if they find it violating the trust that has been reposed in it. It is the people’s right to save themselves from any arbitrary or threatening measures the government may lay against them. A government that attempts to violate the ‘fundamental, sacred, and unalterable law of self-preservation,’ which is the ultimate reason men entered
into civil society, has to be removed from power (Locke, 2012, 119, 103—104). Coicaud notes on the reciprocal dimension of legitimacy. In other words, there exists a mutual responsibility between the rulers and the ruled, and when either party breaks this responsibility, no obligation to obey any longer exists. The governed have to right to evaluate the actions of the rulers and to defend their own rights and freedom within the society, and they only have to follow their duties towards the rulers as long as the rulers fulfill their role. According to Coicaud, there has to exist an analogy between the society’s core values and the rulers’ actions. Only when the political reality corresponds to the original values can there be legitimacy. The rulers’ legitimacy is dependent on their capabilities to rise up to the expectations set upon them (Coicaud, 2002, 39—42).

The Vichy government actively violated the rights of its citizens, participating in the mass deportations of Jews and creating a paramilitary force to harness any opposing opinions. It operated under the orders of Hitler and sent French citizens to Germany for forced labor. Therefore it is safe to argue that the Vichy government failed to fulfill, and in fact actively violated, the rights and responsibilities allocated to a legitimate government. It failed to protect the natural rights of the French people and participated in violations of their rights to life, liberty and estate, acting against the core values of the French society. In the process the Vichy government placed itself into a state of war with the French people, and lost its legitimacy. As the people were facing a threat to their existence and to their natural rights, they had the right to overthrow the government.

Locke’s belief in the right to overthrow the legislature extends to his discussion on the powers and role of the executive. Locke held *salus populi suprema lex* as a fundamental rule and argued that anyone who follows it ‘cannot dangerously err’ (Locke, 2012, 110—111). Whatever action that can be accepted to be for the good of the people will always be justified. Locke recognized that the executive has a prerogative to act according to his own judgment when matters of public good are under discussion, and, if necessary, to act against the law. The executive’s discretion counterbalances the government’s failures in action (Ibid., 112). Despite not legally holding the position of an executive, de Gaulle created a role for himself as the leader of the Free French and the highest authority of the ‘government in exile’. Because the legally elected executive had failed to fulfill its role and responsibilities, in a sense de Gaulle became an executive *de facto*. However controversial and aloof his character, on a personal level de Gaulle both sacrificed and suffered enormously to protect France and to ensure its post-war independence. He despised any
luxurious propensities, paid most of his official expenses from his own pocket and refused any privileges that would come with a high office. Albeit his authoritarian tendencies, military background and thirst for power, de Gaulle believed in democracy and authority by legal means, despite fears that he might attempt a military coup. From a young age, he only aimed towards securing what he saw to be in the best interest of France (Fenby, 2010, 265, 379, Kissinger, 1994, 602—603).

5. The French Resistance

‘On ne fait pas de révolution sans révolutionnaires. Et il n’y a qu’un révolutionnaire en France: c’est moi.’ Charles de Gaulle

In the previous chapter I argued that the Vichy regime was not a legitimate authority on the basis of its dubious creation and the violations it produced against its own citizens, which caused the ultimate loss of its moral authority. I argued for a multidimensional understanding on the concept of legitimacy, and noted that the delegitimation process of the Vichy regime included both the illegal aspect as well as failure to follow the moral norms of good government. The Vichy government’s loss of legitimacy provided a space for a new power to emerge; as explained previously, it is my understanding that in a political context there cannot exist two legitimate authorities at the same time. It is necessary for the incumbent to lose its legitimacy before a new authority can make a justified claim to power. The Free French and the French Resistance materialized from the Vichy regime’s loss of moral authority, and continued the fight to free their motherland. The Resistance belongs to the contentious tradition of the French history, which has witnessed regular intervals of contentious action. Despite initially involving only small numbers of dissidents, by the end of the war the Resistance had grown to substantial numbers. De Gaulle was the first person to publicly denounce the Pétain government and to call for continued opposition. As such, and through his efforts to unify the dissidents under his command, he emerged as the leader of the newly found resistance.

15 Mauriac, 1970, 60
16 The Free French is the resistance organization founded by de Gaulle in London in 1940, whereas the (French) Resistance refers collectively to the various resistance groups in France, fighting independently against the occupiers
As in the previous sections, the historical events will briefly be outlined, followed by a theoretical analysis.

5.1. The Birth of Resistance

De Gaulle received the news of Prime Minister Reynaud’s resignation and Marshal Pétain’s accession the evening of his return from England, where he had been negotiating with the British on the joint Franco-British war efforts. Refusing to accept an armistice with the enemy, de Gaulle departed back to England the following day (Fenby, 2010, 28—29). On June 18, 1940, de Gaulle was given permission by the British to use BBC to broadcast his message of continued resistance to the public. *L’Appel du 18 juin*, as the speech would be known, was heard by very few people that evening but would later be known as one of the greatest orations of its era. ‘Mais le dernier mot est-il dit? L’espérance doit-elle disparaître? La défaite est-elle définitive? Non!’ de Gaulle exclaimed and called all French soldiers who were in Britain or who might end up there to come join him. Arguing against the defeatist mood prevalent in France, de Gaulle insisted that this was not a lonesome war, but a worldwide fight that could be won with the support of Britain and the United States (de Gaulle, 1954, 70, de Gaulle, 1970, 3—4).

From the start de Gaulle had proposed to Churchill the formation of a French National Committee, which would carry on the fight alongside Britain. Churchill agreed and the British made two public statements on 23 June 1940: the first denied that the Vichy government was able to function independent from the enemy, and the second, in advance, made public Britain’s decision to acknowledge a French National Committee when one would officially be formed. On 7 August 1940 de Gaulle and Churchill signed an agreement between the Britain and the Free France (de Gaulle, 1954, 79—81). However, the committee had no constitutional foundation and had no support from France’s parliamentarians. The Pétain government was still the legal authority in the country.

The armistice between France and Germany came into effect on 25 June 1940, and three days later the British officially recognized de Gaulle as ‘chef des Français Libres’. Meanwhile in France de Gaulle’s promotion to General was cancelled, and he was sentenced to death for treason, desertion and helping the enemy. In addition, he was
condemned to national degradation (de Gaulle, 1954, 80, Fenby, 2010, 137–138). While de Gaulle and the Free French enjoyed the support of the British people, the French community in Britain was less enthusiastic. De Gaulle’s way of embodying the Free French movement into his own persona turned many people off, and it was said that members of the French community in Britain switched to the other side of the road to avoid passing known Gaullists. Therefore the Free French committee was not able to rise up to the expectations that had been placed on it, with de Gaulle’s reserved mannerism not being able to attract many of the French troops remaining in Britain. Of the two thousand French soldiers in London only a tenth signed up to fight for Free French, while some chose to join the British forces and others wished to be repatriated. According to an estimation by the British, at most the Free French forces included 4,000 soldiers, 1,000 sailors and 150 airmen (Fenby, 2010, 137–138).

Though the armistice of 1940 and the degree of collaboration with Germany continue being sensitive topics in France, it is generally agreed that the majority of the people in unoccupied zones were accepting of the armistice. The turmoil that had characterized France for the previous years meant that the majority of the French people were just trying to get on with their lives and survive the best they could. There were some resisters and fanatics, but most people belonged to a passive majority, quietly accepting what was to come (Cobb, 2009, 2–3). So for the first two years of the war, there was barely any French resistance. Some isolated voices tried to oppose the armistice through the distribution of pamphlets, but in truth they were few. The French Communist party had its hands tied because of the Nazi-Soviet pact until June 1941, when Hitler advanced to Russia. Moscow then called for an armed struggle against the Germans, and the Communist party in France widened its tactics to involve non-Communists as well. In the end, Front National movement became the largest Resistance group in France, and had an action branch called Francs-tireurs partisans. Other resistance groups also arose. An aristocrat named Emmanuel d’Astier de la Vigerie headed a resistance group called Libération-sud, which was formed in July 1941 with Socialist support. In November 1941 former officer Henri Frenay organized another non-Communist group, Combat, after becoming disillusioned with the Vichy government. In Lyon the Franc-tireur group appealed to people from all sides of the political spectrum, and the city also hosted another group of partisans called L’Armée des Ombres (Fenby, 2010, 206–207).
The resistance groups in France operated mainly through sabotage, targeting especially railway tracks and targeting enemy traffic. During 1942 and 1943 they also managed to strike several factories, a large power plant and a German artillery depot. Attacks were launched against collaborationists and attempts to free captured fighters were concluded. Resistance newspapers flourished, with the largest reaching circulations of 450,000 by 1944. In the Fall of 1941 some resistance groups began operating hit-and-run assassinations which led the Germans to respond with reprisal executions. In October 1941, fifty people were shot near Bordeaux and forty-seven in Chateaubriand in retaliation for attacks on Germans. The Nazi policy was harsh: for each killed German soldier, 50 to 100 imprisoned Frenchmen were executed. After these events de Gaulle advised the partisans to refrain from further assassination attempts. He said that it was perfectly understandable that the French people were killing Germans, but he cautioned that it was too easy for Germans to retaliate by slaughtering French fighters. His advice did not sound well to the members of the Resistance in France, as to them de Gaulle was just a voice on the radio. A notable resistance fighter remarked how de Gaulle had not been with them in France, sharing their dangers or participating in the attacks against Vichy (Tilly, 1986, 332, Fenby, 2010, 207—208).

Jean Moulin, a former civil servant who had attempted to slit his own throat when Hitler invaded France, arrived in London in September 1941 claiming to be a representative of three French resistance groups. In truth, he was not a delegate to any party despite having had some contacts with resistance leaders. He was, however, a very talented individual with a senior ranking in the French government, who quickly became a supporter of de Gaulle. A few months later Moulin was given the task of unifying the Resistance under de Gaulle’s leadership. He was parachuted into France in January 1942 with clear orders and 250,000 francs. In France he lived a double life under the Vichy regime, simultaneously acting as a retired prefect and a resistance organizer, working to unite the various resistance groups under the future Armée Secrète (Fenby, 2010, 208—209). After Moulin, other Resistance figures also travelled to London following his footsteps; there was also support from Latin America and Egypt. In October 1942 de Gaulle headed a meeting of Resistance chiefs in London, with d’Astier and Frenay in attendance. Both men opposed being under the leadership of Moulin and resented his powers. De Gaulle made his thoughts clear; he ended one conversation with the simple declaration that it was him who was to give orders. Frenay responded that they would follow orders as soldiers, but
otherwise were free citizens. To this de Gaulle replied: ‘Well, France will choose between you and me’ (Ibid., 209).

De Gaulle wanted the resistance groups to function in the same organized and hierarchical manner as the army and appointed a general, Charles Delestraint, to be the head of the *Armée Secrète*. The three main resistance groups would be united in a committee, presided over by Moulin, and with other resistance units affiliated. This arrangement created some struggles between de Gaulle and the Resistance, with Delestraint and Frenay often disagreeing strongly. At the time, however, it was essential to be in unison in order to fight the Germans (Ibid., 209). The British provided de Gaulle with a noteworthy weapon in the form of BBC, allowing him to broadcast messages that were used to pass secret messages to the resistance and as a propaganda tool against Vichy and the occupiers. De Gaulle was a noted speaker whose orations were well-prepared and full of references to French history and culture. His broadcasts resulted in his voice becoming familiar to the French public, who came to associate de Gaulle with the refusal to accept defeat and calls for resistance. On 29 November 1940 he concluded: ‘C’est ainsi que, demain, revivra notre France’ (de Gaulle, 1970, 45). There were also two other programs, whose contributors were journalists, spokespeople and noted writers. The number of people listening to these broadcasts rose from 300,000 in the beginning of 1941 to over three million by the end of the following year (Fenby, 2010, 210).

Moulin succeeded in uniting the different resistance groups under one broad umbrella organization, *Mouvements unis de la résistance*, by January 1943. The organization was later to be called *Conseil National de la Résistance*. This was not a signal of unanimous approval of Moulin or his presidency of the internal Resistance, but it was clear to all parties that it was necessary to have a central figure to lead the opposition to Vichy, and de Gaulle was the only person possible to fulfill this role. Resistance leader d’Astier began to refer to de Gaulle as ‘the Symbol’, and Pineau, after a heated discussion with de Gaulle in London, noted that the resistance leaders were willing to recognize de Gaulle’s authority because it was necessary to have one leader whom to follow (Ibid., 211). The expectation of Allied victory, the application of forced labor in Germany and the steadily growing repression all contributed to increasing support for the resistance, which despite some internal problems now numbered 150,000 people. A US report described the partisans as
having the capacity to assist the Allies and their operations in France by creating turmoil within the country (Ibid., 226).

Oppression grew radically in late 1943 due to serious incidents and the growth of partisan activity in metropolitan France. At the beginning of the following year, summary courts judged partisans and suspects were shot arbitrarily. German troops got increasingly involved in suppressing the Resistance and mass shooting of civilians occurred as revenges for sabotage attempts. Resistance leaders in turn hardened their speech and called for quick impeachment of traitors. Civil servants who obeyed the Vichy regime were guilty of ‘cowardice and punishable servility’ (Ibid., 233). By April 1944 and together with his colleagues de Gaulle had set in place a framework of the Republic they hoped to establish after the liberation of France. Internal military affairs included the Forces françaises de l'intérieur which was supposed to involve all existing Resistance groups. In truth, many units acted independently and according to their own rules. Sabotage of railway lines ran high and some partisans successfully occupied a town. Collaborators were punished severely. Three years earlier, the Free French radio broadcasts from Britain had prodded the French people to execute their own terror to counteract that of Vichy and the Germans. The time before the Liberation should witness attacks against enemies of the country as called by the united Resistance movements (Ibid., 236—237).

The Allied faced strong resistance by the German troops in France, and the number of civilian casualties was great. Resistance fighters helped the Allied fighters to advance by sabotaging German supply lines and attacking retreating enemy troops (Ibid., 246). In Paris the Resistance began a rising on 15 August, 1944 with railway workers going on strike followed by the city’s bus and undergrounds transportation systems. 20,000 police stayed home after the Germans disarmed their colleagues in one of the city’s districts. This meant a problem to de Gaulle who had to make sure that the partisans did not move from an insurrection to trying to establish a revolutionary government. He wrote to his senior representative in France and insisted that the Resistance fighters should follow military lines and the command system of the state de Gaulle was about to re-establish (Ibid., 250—251). A general strike was launched in Paris on 18 August. Parisians were ordered to mobilize by the unified Resistance command, and the City Hall, railway stations and other public buildings were occupied. A portrait of de Gaulle replaced the bust of Marshall Pétain at Hôtel de Ville, the building that houses the city’s local administration. Barricades
went up and tree trunks were used to block streets. The enemy demolished the main flour mill to disturb the supply of bread and executed Resistance fighters. The opponents were almost equal in numbers; the Resistance fighters numbered 15,000 armed men against 17,000 Germans. The latter were better armed, but the formed had the popular support behind it (Ibid., 251).

5.2 Social Movements and their Power to Legitimate and Delegitimate

The resistance began slowly, and at most involved 500,000 people, less than two per cent of France’s population. It is estimated that up to 100,000 dissidents died during the war. They were either executed, died in combat or in the camps. The resistance took many forms, also ones that were not directly aggressive towards the Nazis or Vichy. Non-aggressive modes of resistance included listening to BBC and de Gaulle’s broadcasts, which was prohibited, and wearing the colors of the French flag, red white and blue, or offering help to the persecuted Jews. At the time of the war, however, the word ‘resistance’ solely referred to organized action against the collaborators, and in truth, none of the resistance organizations was originally created by de Gaulle. The Resistance was often apprehensive of de Gaulle, while acknowledging his value as a symbol of opposition to Vichy. This apprehension was due to the Resistance and de Gaulle having fundamentally differing objectives. Whereas de Gaulle from the get-go had a clear vision of what he wanted for France, the Resistance consisted of diverse and disorganized groups of dissidents with varied political affiliations and goals (Cobb, 2009, 2—7). However, for the Resistance to gain sufficient momentum to constitute as a social movement, it needed de Gaulle just as de Gaulle needed the various resistance groups to back-up his own position and ensure a unified France post-war.

Tilly and Tarrow (2007) argue that it is in the interface of contention, collective action and politics that contentious politics is formed, and only then are movements powerful enough to truly have an impact in the status quo. De Gaulle was not a resistance leader in the often used sense; he did not emerge to lead from an already established movement, but rather created his own path of defiance before connecting with the various resistance groups in France. De Gaulle and his Free French gained publicity through de Gaulle’s ongoing efforts with the Allied leaders and radio calls to the public, but lacked connections in the mainland. By unifying the various resistance groups under his command, de Gaulle both
ensured his leadership after the war, but also gained legitimacy. Tilly and Tarrow’s (2007, 8-17) criterion for social movements involves a fusion of ‘sustained campaigns of claim making’, public performances such as demonstrations, ‘public displays of worthiness, unity, number and commitment’ that occur on a regular basis, and finally, they build on and their activities are maintained through social movement bases, i.e. organizations, solidarities, traditions and networks. Contentious politics also leads to the emergence of collective claims. As power, shared interest and government policy meet, the issues resonate to more than one individual, resulting in collective claim-making which in turn requires coordination among people. When de Gaulle in 1943 succeeded in uniting the various resistance groups under the Mouvements unis de la résistance and thus under his command, the French Resistance became a unified social movement. Despite the hesitance many resistance leaders felt towards de Gaulle, and keeping in mind that many groups did act outside his command also nearing the end of the war, the creation of a single organization provided a clear movement in opposition of Vichy, and with de Gaulle as its sole leader. The merger of the Free French and the Resistance can be seen as one of the culminating points that enabled a ‘stream of contention’ to transform into a sustained social movement.

The dynamics of contention can be analyzed through a mechanism-process procedure, with the three most common mechanisms encountered in contentious politics being brokerage, diffusion and coordinated action. The first refers to the creation of a new link between previously unlinked places of activity, diffusion signals the growth of a form of contention from one place of activity to another, and finally coordinated action occurs when actors engage in mutual signaling and parallel claim-making on the same target. An example of brokerage, diffusion and coordinated action coming together would be Jean Moulin’s arrival in London and his subsequent return to France to open communication lines with different resistance groups, which later led to the central organization of resistance groups under Mouvements unis de la résistance. Four other mechanisms have also been identified, of which certification can be easily identified in the evolvement of the French Resistance. Great Britain’s recognition of de Gaulle and the Free French provided de Gaulle a negotiation space with the Allies and material as well as political support in the fight against Vichy. Mechanisms can lead to processes, of which mobilization refers to a situation where individuals who previously had stayed outside contentious action began making claims (Tilly & Tarrow, 2007, 31, 34). Despite the fact that the French Resistance
never involved more than two per cent of the country’s population in direct confrontation to the occupiers, the movement grew steadily after the initial lull of the armistice, gaining considerable power by the time of the Liberation.

Contentious politics involves claim-making and thus criticism of the established political processes or the status quo, and Haunss (2007) argues that they necessarily challenge the opponents’ legitimacy. He suggests that due to the highly visible and often powerful roles social movements have, their legitimating or delegitimating power should be taken into consideration in studies about legitimacy, and suggests that many previous social movement studies have done this, even if not explicitly telling so. Because social movements are usually heavily dependent on public support to reach their goals, they need to make their actions and discourses suitable to the acceptable motives of legitimation and/or delegitimation at that time in history. Haunss proposes that a social movement’s legitimating or delegitimizing power will have a considerable impact on the movement’s success. He writes that:

If the success of a given form of action is a function of its potential both for mobilization and for achieving the proclaimed goals, and if this depends on a movement’s ability to present itself as a worthy actor pursuing a legitimate cause, then one can interpret social movements’ repertoires of contention as a sediment of the forms of action that are best able to legitimize a social movement and to delegitimize its opponents (Haunss, 2007, 164).

Suitable forms of collective action are culturally and historically specific. The ability to embrace commonly accepted forms of action enables the movement to enhance its legitimacy and also its potential to delegitimize its opponent. Haunss uses the peaceful protests by the Gandhian repertoire and their willingness to risk their personal safety as examples through which the protestors received a moral legitimacy, which in itself is a statement of independence and ‘as such, delegitimates the movement’s opponents in denying them their claim of representation (Hauns, 2007, 165). By being willing to risk their lives to free their country of the occupiers, the Resistance fighters acquired a moral authority, placing them superior to Vichy which had begun to persecute its own citizens. The Resistance fighters were fighting for French, in direct opposition to Vichy which was under enemy control and killing French citizens. Like the Gandhian protesters, the Resistance exclaimed its independence from Vichy and in this manner delegitimized it. Furthermore, the repertoires of contention, for example demonstrations and rallies, which social movements use, can easily be seen as attempts to delegitimize the government. The
Resistance was heavily involved in sabotage in France, and also disseminated anti-Vichy propaganda. By acting contrary to the government’s orders and continually undermining its authority, the Resistance group denied Vichy any control over them and acted as a delegitimating agent in the process.

Robert Benford’s and David Snow’s (2000) theory of collective action frames portrays social movements as actors who are purposefully engaged in the construction and sustenance of meaning for supporters, opponents and bystanders. Framing refers to a process social movements become engaged in. It necessarily entails an agent, i.e. the social movement and its actors, and it is also contentious, because it involves ‘interpretative frames’ that differ or challenge existing ones. The results of this process are called collective action frames, and they are used to simplify, place and explain events. The frames ‘are action-oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate the activities and campaigns of a social movement organization’ (Benford and Snow, 2000, 613—614). Haunss (2007) encourages the use of collective action frames to study the legitimating and delegitimating powers of social movements. Frames can be used to shame the opponent, and to denounce its behavior. I would also argue that collective action frames can be used to gain legitimacy for the movement itself. De Gaulle, as the Resistance’s identified leader, attributed to the movement’s legitimating and delegitimizing power through his public discourses which were spread through BBC. De Gaulle delegitimized Vichy from the start by disagreeing with the rapid surrender and providing an alternative action-plan. He told French of the Allies, of their country’s unused military resources and encouraged continuing resistance. By referring to the country’s glorious history, he reminded the French people of better times and provided hope for the future. De Gaulle spoke of the country’s glory and heroes, using grandiose language that enabled people to believe that their country still mattered. By the repeated references to all which had been great in France, he associated himself and the Resistance with the French glory. Through the continuous propaganda de Gaulle saved a part of France’s dignity, as he allowed people to believe that their country was much more than collaborative Vichy and the crimes it committed (de Gaulle, 1970, e.g. 3—7, 12, 47, 213).

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5.3. The Right to Resistance

In ‘Vichy or Free France?’ Cassin (1941) voices the concern that the Fourth Republic was established by the Vichy government while under enemy control, without consulting the French people and with the focus of denying the country its freedom to act both at home and abroad. Therefore, Cassin argues, the government had no authority over the French people and those individuals who had joined the resistance movement were not rebels in the traditional sense. Vichy was not a regularly constituted government and it was not independent from the enemy, Germany. Referring to de Gaulle and the French National Committee, Cassin continues that a government in exile can be recognized by other governments if they consider it to represent the national will. Ultimately, he grounds de Gaulle’s and the Free French Force’s legitimacy on values: ‘[t]he right of a people to be masters of their destiny, to choose their own form of government and to determine their relations with other Powers, is a privilege recognized by all civilized countries’. Normative justification for revolutionary action is essential for it to be legitimate, and any action needs to be perceived to fix grave and destructive flaws in the established system. It would be counterintuitive to argue for the true legitimacy of a revolution that would not be based on the common good of at least the majority of the citizenry. Yet there always needs to be some level of perception that comes into play. A normative justification, to act in the good of the people, is not sufficient to legitimize any one person’s opposition; there have to be others who agree that the actions taken are justified.

According to Coicaud, when different groups of society cannot come into agreement over what is just and what is unjust, the values that political institutions are supposed to apply are some of the stakes involved in the struggle that follows. When the struggle expands and an amicable solution gets out of hand, many of the people involved no longer see themselves in their institutions or in the way which social relationships have been organized. Their view of themselves and of their needs is not being met in reality. When the ruler refuses to give in to their demands, they see this as an attack against their rights, personality and identity. This tension eventually evolves into a conflict, as the governed no longer recognize themselves in the political institutions or respect the institutions’ authority. The reciprocal relationship ceases to exist. As some individuals feel that their rights are not being held in respect, they are no longer impelled to follow their duties. The
community’s social climate deteriorates as the individuals feel that the authorities do not respect their core values (Coicaud, 2002, 225).

Once individuals no longer feel motivated to fulfill their duties, they are also less likely to respond to the ruling authorities’ orders. The definition of what is appropriate and what is not becomes hazy, and what is constituted as criminal behavior is no longer clear. The people stop recognizing and agreeing to sanctions against criminal behavior, and without the people’s consent and acknowledgment illegal behavior is not experienced as illegitimate. Institutions no longer have the authority to declare what is good and what is evil, and those individuals who transgress the law are most likely seen as actors of resistance, not criminals. In order for this to happen, the opposition needs to have the odds in its favor. It must maintain support from the greater populace and cannot be reduced to an isolated minority. The critique the opposition voices against the government needs to be shared by a good portion of the society’s members. In order for the critiques to have an impact, they must resonate to the broader audience on areas of key interest. Even if in the beginning the condemnation is voiced by a minority, other members of the society can identify with the claim and when the time comes, move from passive by-standers to more active participation (Ibid., 226). When de Gaulle departed for England, he was alone in his insistence on continued resistance as the majority of the French people and leadership silently agreed to the armistice. He was successful, however, in referring to the core values of the French nation and aided by the crimes the Vichy regime committed, which diminished its legitimacy. With the mood of the nation being grim and the ruling authority violating the core values of the society, de Gaulle was able to connect with the French people through references to the country’s moral character and ability to provide hope of a better future. At the same time, independent resistance groups began forming in France, their birth greatly aided by the establishment of Service du Travail Obligatoire and the young men fleeing from it. The atrocities the Nazis and Vichy committed turned public opinion towards the dissidents. Slowly, the resistance movement gained in momentum.

Beetham defines revolutions as ‘forced changes of political system which take place under the pressure of extra-legal mass action, and lead to an extension of popular involvement in a new political order’. The acquittal of Vichy, and the subsequent formation of a new government with de Gaulle as its lead, is not called a revolution per se because upon the Liberation de Gaulle successfully insisted that during the war, the French government had
gone in exile in his persona. However, Beetham’s framework is still applicable in this context. The key characteristics of a revolution are the involvement of mass civil disobedience and change of the political system. It is ultimately the masses that drive the change, and the end result involves larger political participation by the citizenry. There are different kinds of revolutions, with others intending to restore or reestablish a constitution that had been breached before, and others intending to create a new, innovative political system. Beetham’s analysis of revolutions and legitimacy has two parts; the first involves the discussion of the loss of legitimacy of the old establishment, and the second focuses on the legitimation of the new rule. He argues that at the core of every successful revolutionary process is a legitimacy deficit, the view that the current government is unable to perform according to the general interests of the people. The process becomes revolutionary when the dissatisfaction ties into the lack of the people’s approval. It is the idea of power by the people, of popular sovereignty that has enabled revolutions to be born (Beetham, 1991, 213—215).

Revolutions are not calculated, carefully planned actions. The government may have been losing its legitimacy for a long period of time, before any extensive acknowledgment of this or mass action becomes common. Beetham asserts that revolutions usually begin by a mass protest to oppose a single government measure, to which the government responds by oppression. The government’s move leads into an ‘agenda shift’, where the oppression leads people’s attention to the political system and to challenge the government’s authority. ‘Shift of consciousness’ is a term Beetham uses to describe the connection that people begin to make between the government policies that cause them damage, and the lack of popular sovereignty that has excluded them from the political process. Another key factor to the delegitimation of the government is civil disobedience, which publicly underlines the government’s lack of authority (Ibid., 215—216). The increasing oppression by the Vichy government and the increasingly vocal as well as visible opposition led the Resistance to gain supporters.

In somewhat similar fashion to Haunss, Beetham argues that the emerging new regime receives tremendous legitimacy power from the sacrifices it has endured during the revolution and from the mass mobilization of the people. All the moral prestige that rose from the revolutionary struggles is assigned to the new authority. Nevertheless, Beetham notes that the chaotic state of the given country makes it difficult for the new government
to meet people’s expectations. A gap exists between the moral authority that has been placed on the government’s shoulders and its capacity to realistically reach its goals. The most important factor in the re legitimation process is the installation of a new source of legitimacy, which carries enough popular support to maintain the new government and its policies. Politically restorative revolutions imply a return to an earlier constitutional order that had been pushed aside by a period of authoritarian or corrupted democratic rule. In these situations the process of re legitimation is rather limited, since it involves going back to an already known and accepted political system (Ibid., 221—224).

France was liberated by the Allies. The Resistance aided the Allied troops, but truthfully it was the foreign forces that rid France of the invaders. Led by de Gaulle, the Resistance’s importance was to a large degree in the spiritual freedom it provided to the French people. Tilly (1993) describes the last few months before the Liberation as a quasi-revolutionary situation that was over quickly. Because the mood of the country changed rapidly, and acquiescence from Vichy to the Free French occurred swiftly, the revolutionary situation passed without escalating to full-grown conflict. Without the Resistance and de Gaulle, the French political field would have been void of any credible national authority post-Liberation, leaving its faith in the hands of the Allied leaders. The support the Resistance gained throughout the war signified an increasing consent by the people, and is a crucial element in de Gaulle’s legitimacy. No matter the personal conviction, normative justification or embodiment of national values can a leader claim legitimacy if there is nobody to consent to his authority. This is the perceptive element of legitimacy; a legitimate leader needs to be perceived as such by others.

In a somewhat similar fashion, Weber defined legitimacy as the people’s belief in a leader’s authority. However, I see belief as a deeper personal experience. To believe in somebody’s authority leaves little room for doubt or dissent, and places people under a greater responsibility to follow. A belief means to leave behind a certain degree of independence, and to surrender one’s will under an authority that is deemed greater or more important than personal autonomy. De Gaulle did not have a unified group of supporters to blindly follow his every wish; he was able to inspire tremendous loyalty in people, but there were also plenty of others who followed his orders reluctantly. Therefore I have deemed perception to better describe a situation where a leader’s authority is recognized, but where there is still room for dissent. The Resistance and de Gaulle existed
in a reciprocal relationship, where one could not have succeeded without the other. De Gaulle needed supporters and thus the Resistance to enforce his own position and to back his claim of being the legitimate leader of France. The Resistance needed ‘a flag to follow’, a leader to bring together the distinct factions to a unified effort. In the end, de Gaulle exited as the winner. When he succeeded in gathering the Resistance groups under the umbrella organization of his creation, de Gaulle managed to acquire a part of the legitimacy the Resistance had gained for itself. By becoming the leader of the Resistance he himself gained legitimacy. However, without de Gaulle’s personal characteristics the Resistance would not have been able to unify or provide stability for post-war France. This leads us to the final part of his legitimacy.

6. Charisma

‘A great man? Why, he’s selfish, he’s arrogant, he thinks he’s the centre of the universe. . . You’re right, he’s a great man! ’Winston Churchill17

The Vichy government’s lack of legitimacy left a space in the political sphere of the country for de Gaulle and the French Resistance. The Resistance involved multiple factions that were unified under de Gaulle, who needed followers to ensure the legitimacy of his authority and to gain a sufficiently powerful position to ensure France’s post-war independence. The French Resistance needed a leader who would act as a unified front to the movement and who would deal with the Allies. The Resistance had gained legitimacy for itself through its own actions, and when de Gaulle succeeded in unifying the various groups under his command, he benefited from this legitimacy and acquired some of it to himself. In turn, de Gaulle’s public discourses delegitimized Vichy and strengthened the Resistance’s legitimacy by rooting it ideologically to the country’s history and traditions. De Gaulle portrayal of himself as the embodiment of France would not have been believable had the Resistance groups not gathered under the umbrella he created. Despite the difficulties and opposition he faced, there was no other figure than de Gaulle who could have in such a calculated and passionate manner directed France’s destiny. His personality, charisma and devotion to his motherland drove de Gaulle from a young man, and form a

17 Fenby, 2010, 133
part of his legitimacy. He was able to survive the power struggles of the war almost purely by the strength of his personality.

6.1. The Man behind the Façade

On 28 August 1944, shortly after the liberation of Paris, de Gaulle gathered the Resistance chiefs. To start the meeting, he briefly noted what they had done for France but soon changed to a cold tone to mark that things had now changed. If the partisans did not want to join the regular army, they should go back to being civilians. End of discussion. In de Gaulle’s opinion, the Resistance had come to its end. He enforced this idea multiple times; all belligerent forces needed to be merged into the regular army and no clemency would be shown to those groups who tried to exercise any authority outside or independent of the state. De Gaulle was recalled as saying that despite the partisans being anti-Nazi and anti-Fascist, they were ‘in no way national’. According to de Gaulle, the Resistance did not carry the legitimacy which he claimed for himself. Some groups had hoped for a social and political revolution after the Liberation, and it now became apparent that de Gaulle would not allow this to happen. When a new party that included wartime Gaullists was launched, he did nothing to assist them. He also refused to give any sign of recognition to the non-Communist resistance leaders who broke with the French Communist Party. Though he hurt the feelings of the Resistance leaders, public opinion was behind him. Based on an opinion poll, merely 12 per cent of respondents favored a new political group based on the Resistance. The French people wanted to leave the war years behind and were ready for peace (Fenby, 2010, 267—268).

De Gaulle’s behavior was not unexpected. He had begun to formulate his ideas on leadership, military tactics and politics during the First World War where he served as a captain. Wounded in battle, de Gaulle was taken as a prisoner of war by the Germans. While captive, he read newspapers and studied German, analyzed military tactics and gave a series of lectures to the other prisoners. A fellow captive remembers that while all the other men referred to each other as tu, nobody ever addressed de Gaulle in the first person. To others he was ‘the Constable’ (Lacouture, 43—46, 50). De Gaulle believed that a leader needed to keep his distance from the followers and lead a solitary life during the battle. In World War II he demonstrated continuous fearlessness during the war, walking straight into the battle and standing upright amid fighting, raising his troops’ morale. He continued
his aloof leadership style, ate and drank alone and did not confide in his officers. One of them noted that as de Gaulle believed his judgment to be the best, he had no need of others. To those questioning his conduct, de Gaulle answered that all men who have done remarkable deeds have been solitary and silent (Fenby, 2010, 125, 127—128).

When the German threat escalated in June 1940 and the mood of the French leadership turned excessively defeatist, Prime Minister Paul Reynaud’s chief of staff noted how de Gaulle was starting to act ‘like a star’. He added that this was because de Gaulle had realized that in order to survive the defeat, France would need ‘a resurrection myth’ and began to create it around himself (Ibid., 17). De Gaulle first met Winston Churchill at a Franco-British summit that was held on 11 June, 1940. Pétain and Weygand were expressing their desperation while Churchill argued that as long as Britain remained free, there was still hope for France. Members of Churchill’s envoy noted that de Gaulle was the only one keeping his composure and intelligence, in contrast to the other French who the British observed to appear waiting for their final judgment (Ibid., 19).

De Gaulle did not receive immediate support when he broke from the Vichy government and initiated the Free French. In truth, he struggled to gain power both for himself and the movement right until the liberation of Paris. The personal effort he poured into action was tremendous. Throughout the war years everything he did was towards one purpose only; the liberation and grandeur of his motherland. To make up for the debilitated France, de Gaulle began to create an image that entangled his persona with that of France. In short, he aimed to strengthen the state of France through the power and perseverance of his own personality (de Gaulle, 1954, 70). De Gaulle’s persistence on French honor and glory as well as his demands for France to be treated as an equal, powerful partner amidst the Brits and Americans gave the British frequent headaches. He was so insistent, that even one of the most prominent British supporters of the Free French noted that de Gaulle might be out of his mind. His persistency and mannerism often frustrated the Allies. ‘I hate all Frenchmen’, declared the British Foreign Secretary when presented with a cable from de Gaulle (Fenby, 2010, 173). In a meeting held in the beginning of 1943 in Morocco, President Roosevelt accentuated the significance of French unity and expressed his opinion that there was not one single group amongst the various factions of the French resistance movement that could claim sole legitimacy. Roosevelt continued by pointing out that de Gaulle, for one, had never been elected into any office. De Gaulle’s response referred to
French history and tied his image as the incarnation of France to a famous symbol of the nation. His, like Joan of Arc’s, legitimacy had come for always having hope and taking initiative. De Gaulle’s diligence and adherence to his role were exemplified in a rough incident with Churchill. After their argument, Churchill remarked to his doctor how France had given up fighting, how de Gaulle had no country to return to, and that if the British would refuse him, he would be finish. But yet, de Gaulle behaved like he was Stalin, with vast armies to command and support his claims, maybe ‘the last survivor of a warrior race’ (Ibid., 198—199).

De Gaulle entered France on 14 June 1944, when the Allied forces in the country totaled almost 600,000 men. At the end of a meeting where Churchill had revealed the date for the Allied troops’ landing, he raised a toast to de Gaulle, a man who refused to accept defeat (Ibid., 239). When de Gaulle arrived in Bayeux, the first of the liberated towns, the crowd was elated:

At the sight of General de Gaulle, the inhabitants stood in a kind of daze, then burst into bravos or else tears. Rushing out of their houses, they followed after me, all in the grip of an extraordinary emotion. The children surrounded me. The women smiled and sobbed. The men shook my hands. We walked on together, all overwhelmed by comradeship, feeling national joy, pride and hope rise again from the depths of the abyss (De Gaulle, 1998, 564).

De Gaulle refused to let anyone, including the Allied leaders, to dictate what would happen in France after the Liberation. He was an avid believer in national sovereignty, and his insistence on a strong, powerful and independent France became one of the most prominent characteristics of Gaullism. To ensure that France would remain France after the Liberation, de Gaulle wanted to play his cards right in the immediate period after Paris had been freed by the Allied troops. At Hôtel de Ville he echoed this sentiment in a speech he gave to the huge crowds:

He concluded that:

Nous autres, qui aurons vécu les plus grandes heures de notre Histoire, nous n’avons pas à vouloir autre chose que de nous montrer, jusqu’à la fin, dignes de la France. Vive la France! (de Gaulle, 1970, 439-440)

De Gaulle did attest to the help of the Allies but his emphasis was on France and the French people. When one of the Resistance leaders pleaded him to proclaim the Republic, de Gaulle answered that the Republic had been incarnated in the Free French movement and its successors. Vichy had never been a legitimate authority. De Gaulle was now the Prime Minister of a republican government, so why should he proclaim it, he asked (Fenby, 2010, 254—255). Despite having pushed the Germans out, the situation in Paris continued unstable. The city had snipers shooting from rooftops, most of them members of the Milice, the paramilitary force created by Vichy. De Gaulle arranged a triumphant walk along the Champs-Élysées on 26 August, and continued to Notre-Dame. When he arrived to the cathedral, shooting began and spectators flung themselves to the ground. Despite the fire, de Gaulle marched through the church and stood erect the whole service, disregarding that anything out of the ordinary would have happened (de Gaulle, 1998, 657).

After the war, de Gaulle persistently worked towards securing France a place among the global powers. As of after the Liberation, this was not the case. France was absent from the Yalta and Potsdam summits that established the shape of post-war Europe. In both summits many important matters that concerned France were under discussions, but the French government was not consulted. De Gaulle succeeded in making sure that France was present at the ceremony for the Allied victory in Berlin. His insistence on France’s Great Power status paid off, even when there really was nothing to back up such a claim. President Roosevelt died in April 1945, and was succeeded by Harry Truman, who received a memorandum from the then Secretary of State Edward Stettinius. In the memorandum Stettinius noted that the insistence to reinstating prestige after the war resulted in the French at times making request that were out of proportion to their actual strength. Nevertheless, he concluded that Americans should take this into consideration and treat France according to her potential power, rather than her current strength (Fenby, 2010, 282).
De Gaulle aimed to restore order in the country, and his approval ratings were high. A poll reported that 63 per cent of respondents were in favor of de Gaulle’s actions, 24 per cent were against and 13 per cent did not know. The majority of the French middle class approved of de Gaulle as they saw him as a trustworthy leader who would keep the Communists out, but de Gaulle himself was critical of the bourgeoisie, which he said had supported the Pétain government ‘because it wanted no interruption in its dinner parties’. As the working class had played a significant role in the Resistance, de Gaulle did not believe it could be kept in the subservient position it had been in before the war. Therefore social and economic reforms were necessary (Ibid., 270). De Gaulle did not feel any affiliation to the political parties in France, greatly due to what he saw as their failure to put their disagreements aside to push for the good of the nation in the tumultuous times before the war. Nevertheless, he had accepted the support of the parties while in London and Algiers and through their support had gained some of their democratic legitimacy. As a result, nobody disagreed with de Gaulle becoming the Prime Minister after the Liberation. However, considering what had happened with Pétain, party leaders insisted that democracy meant that legislature, deriving from the people through parliamentary elections, had to rule supreme. De Gaulle, to the contrary, believed in a direct democratic link between voters and the executive, in other words himself. He had survived the war years by insisting on his claim to be the incarnation of France, and he was not to be tarnished by party politics (Ibid., 261–262).

6.2. The Workings of a Charismatic Leader

Cobb (2009, 6), referring to the three vastly differing visions of France that the Allies, the Resistance and de Gaulle had, writes that: ‘[i]t is one history’s sharper ironies that in this triangular tension it was de Gaulle who eventually triumphed, even though he owed virtually everything to the two rival forces’. Ever the lone figure, de Gaulle triumphed in large part due to the strength of his persona. Charismatic authority receives its legitimacy purely from the charisma of its holder, and Weber describes charisma as ‘the greatest revolutionary force’ for its ability to motivate followers internally. Charismatic authority has the capacity to change perceptions and beliefs, and to motivate followers on a deeply personal level (Weber, 1964, 363). De Gaulle enraged some, but he also gathered many believers. To them, he was a symbol of something greater. Governor General Catroux of French Indochina, who was the most high-ranking official of the French army to join de
Gaulle, remarked to an accomplice that ‘de Gaulle is France and I put myself under his orders because I was at the orders of France’ (Fenby, 2010, 149, 154). De Gaulle’s charisma did not come from approachability, or warmth. He was aloof and distant, accentuated status differences, and at 1.95 cm tall towered above others. De Gaulle ran cabinet meetings as he would command in the army; there was little room left for dissent (Gardner, 1991, 27, Dallas, 2005, 90, Fenby, 2010, 266).

The exemplary characteristics of a charismatic leader form the basis of his authority. The superior character of the leader makes others follow him, and it is their recognition of his superiority which validates the leader’s claim to legitimacy. Charismatic authority is solely dependent on the persona of the leader, and is therefore highly sensitive to outside events. When a charismatic leader falls victim to a strain of unlucky events, his charisma is deemed to diminish (Weber, 1964, 359). De Gaulle’s time as the head of government turned out short, as he grew increasingly frustrated and disappointed with the parties and their inability to rise above party politics to reconstruct the post-war France. Still placing great emphasis in his prestige and image, de Gaulle believed that the public diminishment of his power would harm the nation. Unwilling to compromise his belief in the necessity of a strong executive, he decided to step out. This decision was further enforced when de Gaulle was not invited to participate in the discussions of the Constituent Assembly, which was drawing a new constitution for France. He was told that because he was not a member of the parliament, he would not be able to participate in the proceedings (de Gaulle, 1998, 987—988). After stepping out of office, he attempted to gain power through the Rally of the French People, only to find his party losing in the elections. After the loss de Gaulle retired to his country home to write the Mémoires de Guerre, his message to the French people. In the Mémoires de Guerre de Gaulle builds up his role in history as the savior of France, who makes up for the lack of electoral legitimacy through relentless work for his homeland. He progresses from the use of ‘I’ to the use of ‘de Gaulle,’ referring to himself in the third person as if he was France. The first volume of the book was published with great success in October 1954. The first month sales were nearing one hundred thousand copies and in total, the sales of the complete book added to two million copies (Fenby, 2010, 348, 362, Dallas, 2005, 89).

Despite the charismatic leadership’s ability to inspire people, Weber stated that it can only function for a limited period of time, as charismatic authority cannot remain static. For a
time, this held true to de Gaulle as well. Once the war ended, he was not ready to compromise on his ideals for political power and as a result had to step down. In the mid-1950’s only 1 per cent of respondents could see de Gaulle returning as Prime Minister (Fenby, 2010, 362).

However, three years later in 1958 things had changed. France was in turmoil because of the situation in Algiers; there were allegedly thirteen conspiracies to overthrow the government. The situation was out of the control of the leadership of the Fourth Republic, and slowly a conclusion was drawn: only de Gaulle would be sufficiently strong to handle the crisis. Answering the calls urging him to return to the political stage, de Gaulle issued a statement where he announced his readiness to assume powers and once again save the nation from any danger it was facing. His statement was read out in Algiers, where 30,000 Algerians marched out with the French flag in support of de Gaulle. Throughout the negotiations of his return to power, de Gaulle placed himself above party politics and refrained from either support or condemning the rebels in Algiers. He effectively acted as he would stood above all else, as a symbol of the national unity he saw himself as representing, and eventually, as how others saw him too. Le Monde urged de Gaulle to step into office ‘before the nation is completely torn apart, before it becomes the hostage of one camp or another’ (Ibid., 380, 385, 392).

Weber wrote about the necessity of transformation for charismatic leaders, which initially applied to de Gaulle too, when he stepped down after the Liberation, having not been able to use the strength of his own persona to pass constitutional changes. However, rather than to change himself and to compromise on his ideals, de Gaulle waited for the events to unfold to him. On 1 June, 1958 he regained his position as the head of France. The legislature voted de Gaulle to the post of Prime Minister; he was granted full executive powers for six months, and in addition made public his intention of a constitutional reform. The image de Gaulle had created for himself as the incarnation of France was so strong that when in crisis, the nation turned to him for guidance, even though he had spent several years outside the public eye. Tilly (2004) writes that de Gaulle returned to power with ‘dictatorial controls’ because he seemed as the only person who could solve the situation in Algiers. Despite the undemocratic manner through which he rose to power, de Gaulle strengthened his position through referendums where he gained mass support, and when he finally failed, de Gaulle stepped out peacefully, leading Tilly (1993, 182) to conclude that
‘[t]hus France’s prime soldier-politician of the twentieth century left office without so much as a feint toward a military seizure of power.’

Despite his difficult reputation — Kissinger (1994, 602) writes that in the United States ‘it became fashionable to accuse the French President of suffering from delusions of grandeur’— de Gaulle was not a self-serving man, at least not in the common sense. Ultimately, he grounded his actions in the good of France. He had equated himself to France, claiming to embody it in his persona, and for the good of his country he was willing to suffer personally. Kissinger notes de Gaulle’s devotion to the cause of rescuing the French identity from the humiliation of WWII; from the French army’s rapid surrender and the violations conducted by the Vichy government. Kissinger writes that de Gaulle’s dilemma was ‘how to restore identity to a country suffused with a sense of failure and vulnerability’ and that de Gaulle ‘found it necessary to compensate for his society’s deep-seated insecurities by a haughty, even overbearing, demeanor’ (Kissinger, 1994, 602—603). De Gaulle’s charisma was not the warm, embracing kind that leaders like Nelson Mandela (after his release from Robben Island) and Martin Luther King depicted. Kissinger’s account of his meeting with de Gaulle remembers his hesitation to address the then President of France, who did not appreciate debating with, nor being in the presence of assistants. To Kissinger’s question regarding how France was to prevent Germany from dominating Europe, de Gaulle simply replied: ‘Par la guerre’ (Ibid., 604).

Instead of progressing to the legal or traditional stage, de Gaulle’s charismatic authority formed a circle, allowing him to rely on the strength of his own persona yet again. Monique Clague supports this perspective in her article ‘Conceptions of Leadership: Charles de Gaulle and Max Weber’. De Gaulle’s failure to fit into the framework of the inevitable routinization of charismatic authority brings out flaws in this part of Weber’s sociological theory. Clague (1975, 434) criticizes Weber for postulating ‘the existence of the charismatic leader as the object, at the point of genesis, of extensive and intensive follower-devotion’. Weber failed to note the underlying conditions, the historical and social processes which lie beneath charismatic leadership, or investigate the impact that the leader’s attempt to gain legitimacy and followers had on the values and norms he then chooses to represent. Instead, Weber ‘assumed that the leader’s self-attribution of charisma […] correlated with a popular consensus on his claims’. An un-known person does not suddenly rise to popular knowledge with wide support. Instead, he is forced to
gather support and mobilize people before claiming a position as the savior of the nation. The fact that de Gaulle was unknown when he initiated his campaign ‘necessitated a strategy of legitimation adapted to the historical and cultural context in which he acted out his historic role’ (Clague, 1975, 434—435). It should be noted, however, that despite the cyclical nature of de Gaulle’s charismatic authority, his legacy in the form of Gaullism has followed a progressive path and has become routinized into mainstream French political culture. A further proof of de Gaulle’s legacy is the fact that despite the passing of its originator, Gaullism survives to this day, and its ideas have been adopted by many prominent French politicians, including past presidents.

De Gaulle adapted to the historical and cultural context by making excessive use of French symbols, for example the Cross of Lorraine, and had powerful stories from both World Wars to back up his image. He was also a master of words and the use of the French language, which he used successfully to connect to the French people through the radio during the war time, and through the television once president. A reporter for Le Monde described de Gaulle’s press conferences as ‘high masses’ and ‘the absolute weapon of the regime.’ Despite his ability to use different symbols and the media to enforce his public persona, de Gaulle truly believed in his message. The way in which he identified with France had begun already as an adolescent, if not earlier. De Gaulle strengthened his position by a direct electoral vote a few years later, but again he had risen to power for being himself (Dallas, 2005, 91, Fenby, 2010, 398, 419).

7. Conclusion

‘En ce moment, le pire de son histoire, c’était à moi d’assumer la France’

Charles de Gaulle

One of the most prominent leaders of the 20th Century, Charles de Gaulle, twice rose to power outside traditional democratic processes to guide his troubled homeland into calmer waters. A controversial figure, de Galle was accused of autocratic and Fascist tendencies from time to time throughout his life. During the resistance, these concerns were raised by some British and French spectators. Later on, especially the Left saw de Gaulle’s military

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18 de Gaulle, 1954, 74
background as a threat and perceived him as a soldier-dictator. His aloof and authoritarian mannerism, his emphasis on nationalism and strong leadership, and his tendency to consult only himself when making decisions even while serving as the President, did not convey the most democratic style of leadership (Fenby., 176, 299). Yet he was also a loved and admired symbol of the nation, offering peace, stability, and most importantly, faith, to France and its people when they needed it the most. Through the strength and power of his persona, he incarnated France and left his mark on the country, visible to this day.

During his lifetime, de Gaulle’s legitimacy was under scrutiny by members of the public, the French political leadership, and the Allies. While still alive, his supporters argued that de Gaulle’s legitimacy came from everything he had done for France and for the way he had come to symbolize France in his own persona. Critics argued that he had no place in authority for the fact that he had not been elected into office. After his death in 1970, de Gaulle’s legitimacy has been taken as granted, and not questioned nor explained in further detail. I, too, began from the premise that de Gaulle was a legitimate leader, and do not question his legitimacy per se. Rather, I was interested in finding out the particular elements of legitimate leadership in this context. How and why was de Gaulle able to claim legitimacy as a leader despite rising to power outside democratic processes? What was the basis of his legitimacy?

The aim of this thesis has been to explore the elements that construed de Gaulle’s legitimacy. My argument for the basis of his legitimacy has been fourfold. The French national identity, in other words the historical and cultural tradition of France, forms the groundwork for de Gaulle’s legitimacy. It was from this tradition of contention that de Gaulle and the French Resistance exerted a tremendous influence that guided their actions and initiated the opposition. Following Coicaud, I started with the premise that the norms and values of a country form its national identity, and this identity needs to be protected. France has a contentious history, where protests and opposition to governmental actions that are deemed unjust are accepted. The humiliating armistice the Vichy government made with Germany was in violation of the French military and historical tradition. This led to de Gaulle to embark on a road to save the French honor and to defend the country’s core values, and also birthed the various independent resistance movements. Both de Gaulle’s and the Resistance’s behavior followed the commonly accepted repertoires of

19 De Gaulle was directly elected into office for the first time in 1962.
contention that have marked France’s history. By applying repertoires of contention that were suitable to the specific historical and cultural tradition of the country, de Gaulle and the Resistance ensured legitimacy to their actions. De Gaulle’s ability to successfully identify the core values of the nation, and then to use these values to connect with the French people, were a crucial element in him becoming a justified leader.

The second element in de Gaulle’s legitimization process is the Vichy government and the crimes it committed, as these provided the space and moral justification both for de Gaulle and the French Resistance to arise. The Vichy government is acknowledged to having been under German influence during World War II. As such it cannot be seen as truly advancing and promoting the best interest of the French people, or to represent the country’s values. An independent, democratic country requires a government free from enemy pressure, and one that does not persecute its own citizens. The mellowness, giving up without real resistance, was also in contradiction to France’s military and cultural tradition as well as the country’s traditional standing on global power politics. I argued for a sequential process: it was necessary for Vichy to lose its legitimacy first before a place could open for de Gaulle and the Resistance. I also noted that the legal understanding of legitimacy is not enough, and that there must be a normative element for the true depiction of the term. Following Locke and his understanding that the purpose of a government is to protect the natural rights of its citizens, I argued that by violating the natural rights of the French people, Vichy broke the norms of good government, placing itself in the state of war with the French citizens and thus enabling them to use their right to revolution. De Gaulle’s motivation, on the other hand, was the good of his homeland and its people, providing a normative justification for his leadership.

A leader needs followers, and this holds particularly true to a resistance leader. The transition from a rebel to a legitimate leader requires support by a credible number of people, and their acknowledgment of the leader’s justified authority. Despite their hesitation, the Resistance leaders agreed to follow de Gaulle, which enforced his authority. Therefore the French Resistance forms an essential part of de Gaulle’s legitimacy. Following Hauuss’ view of social movements having the power to legitimate and delegitimate, I saw the Resistance as having gained legitimacy independently. When de Gaulle succeeded in unifying the various resistance movements under his command, he managed to acquire some of this legitimacy to himself. He also added to the Resistance’s
legitimacy through his public discourses, which he used to denounce Vichy and reduce its legitimacy, but also to frame himself and the Resistance as the carriers of French values and as the future saviors of the country. Following Beetham, I noted that the violations committed by Vichy led to its loss of legitimacy, which then meant that acts such as opposing and sabotaging the government were no longer deemed illegitimate by the populace. I also argued that, in a similar fashion to Weber’s argument on people’s belief in the authority’s legitimacy, it is perception that more accurately describes de Gaulle’s predicament. De Gaulle was a controversial figure, and despite many ardent followers, there were also people who followed him hesitantly. Regardless, these persons too, perceived de Gaulle as the best, if not the only option, to unite and lead the French out of World War II. The French Resistance and their perception of de Gaulle as a worthy leader added to his legitimacy.

Finally, de Gaulle’s charisma and persona are elemental when studying his legitimacy. His ability to inspire, evoke trust and unite the French when most needed is a testament to the power of his persona. On the contrary to Weber’s argument regarding the necessity for charismatic authority to transform into either legal or traditional, de Gaulle’s authority moved in a circle, enabling him to rise into a position of power by the means of charismatic authority twice. De Gaulle made strong references to France’s history and cultural traditions, creating an image of himself as the incarnation of the country and at various times comparing himself to Joan of Arc. He was so successful in creating this image that even after his retirement, the country came calling for him in times of need. De Gaulle’s legitimacy is in many ways the result of a specific historical context, but the power of his own persona cannot be underestimated. His vision of France and of himself enabled him to persevere through all the struggles WWII put into his way and to succeed in creating a stable and independent future for France.

Regardless, it is my belief that none of the above mentioned elements would have sufficed on its own. All four are connected and intertwined, with one leading to the other. The Vichy regime had to lose its legitimacy before de Gaulle could credibly make a justified claim to power. De Gaulle could not have gathered the support he did if the Vichy government would have followed the rules of good government and protected the natural rights of its citizens. A normative justification, ‘Salus populi suprema lex’ needs to tie into the context of the country in question, and resonate with the nation’s core values. Normative justification is also not enough to legitimize the actions of a leader if the
populace does not agree with him or does not support his actions. The Resistance was needed to enforce de Gaulle’s position, but without being able to frame and tie himself to France’s national identity, and had he not been able to provide a normative justification, the Good of France, for his cause, de Gaulle would not have gathered all the legitimacy he did. Charisma enabled de Gaulle to gather supporters and to build such a powerful image of himself, but this image would have been void and would not have lasted as long as it did if de Gaulle had not truly held France’s and the French people’s best interest as his ultimate goal.

This also raises a question regarding the importance of time; in his situation, is history the only thing that legitimizes de Gaulle? My analysis relies mostly on events that have happened after his initial emergence as a leader, or on ones that require a wider historical perspective. How does time evolve into this? In these kind of cases, is it always necessary to take the long term view to judge on actions? I am inclined to believe that had the Allies lost the war or had de Gaulle been unsuccessful in his attempts, despite the noble moral idea, he most likely would not have received any legitimacy. Therefore I do not see a normative justification to suffice on its own. Especially in de Gaulle’s case, and following Weber’s idea on the necessity for a charismatic leader to succeed in achieving his goals, he had to be successful in his actions to gain legitimacy. Considering his authoritarian tendencies, it may have also been necessary to explore his legitimacy after his death, when any fear of undemocratic or illegal conduct could be truly disregarded. Unlike many other leaders of his time, de Gaulle’s rise to power outside democratic processes led for his legitimacy being a more complex matter. His legitimacy is very much tied into a specific historical context, and is in a sense a product of his time. France and its traditions, the violations committed by the Vichy regime and the success of the French Resistance were all imperative elements of his legitimacy. The final and overarching element, however, was de Gaulle and his persona.
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